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THE CHICAGO PLAN: INCENTIVE ZONING
AND THE PRESERVATION OF
URBAN LANDMARKS

John ]. Costonis

*

Present legal methods for preserving America's architectural
landmarks are being shown to be only minimally effective in pre
serving landmarks located in high development sections of the na
tion's cities. Professor Costonis examines the economic and legal
reasons for the ineffectiveness of these ordinances. He then pro
poses an alternative approach - the Chicago Plan - which promises
to be a more effective solution to the landmark problem. After dis
cussing in detail the features of the Plan, Professor Costonis goes
on to examine and rebut the various legal challenges that might be
brought against the Chicago Plan.
" [ T] he issues really being raised concern the relationship of the
city's past to its present, and what new construction gives a city in
functional, societal and architectural, as well as economic, terms.
Questions are being asked everywhere about institutional attitudes
toward development objectives and the effect of rigid investment
patterns. Ultimately, the problem is the quality of the urban en
vironment and who is responsible for it."
-Ada Louise Huxtable 1

U

RBAN landmarks merit recognition as an imperiled species
alongside the ocelot and the snow leopard.

cent of the

Over fifty per

12 ,ooo buildings listed in the Historic American

Buildings Survey, commenced by the federal government in 1933,
have since been razed.2

The threat to the remainder continues

undiminished as the recent loss of Chicago's Old Stock Exchange
Building

3

and the precarious status of New York's Grand Cen-

*Visiting Associate Professo r of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
A.B. Harvard, 1959; LL.B . Columbia, 1 9 65.
The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance o f Messrs. Jared
Shlaes and John F. Hartray, Jr., with respect to the economics and urban design
elements of the study discussed in this paper. He also expresses his gratitude to
the National Trust for Historic Preservation and the Chicago Chapter Foundation
of the American Institute of Architects for their financial support in this endeavor.
Of course, the author remains solely responsible for any inaccuracies or distortions
that the study may contain.
1 Huxtable, B a nk's Building Plan Sets Off Debate on 'Progress,' N.Y. Times,
Jan. 1 7, 1971, § 8, at l, col. 2.
2 See Conti, Preserving the Past, Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1970, at l, col. x.
3 The Old Stock Exchange B uilding was the work of Louis Sullivan and Dank
mar Adler, two of the most accomplished practitioners o f the internationally
renowned Chicago School of Architecture. A precursor o f the modern skyscraper,
it has been favorably compared with the great palaces of Renaissance Italy in
terms of its historic import. See Huxtable, The Chicago Style -On Its Way Out?,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, § 2, at 27, col. x. The Chicago Landmark Commission,
on two separate occasions during the period l970-7r, urged that the Exchange be
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tral Terminal attest. 4 If this trend is not reversed, the nation at
its bicentennial in 1 9 76 will mourn the loss of an essential part
of its architectural and cultural heritage rather than celebrate the
visible evidence of its past.
The demise of so many cherished buildings is a peculiarly
American phenomenon. In part it reflects the national penchant
for identifying change with progress, even at the cost of destroy
ing the nation's links with its past. More fundamentally, however,
it is the product of a system that vests the initiative for most ur
ban development decisions in private property owners, whose
choices, predictably enough, are shaped by the necessities of the
real estate market. The stubborn reality underlying the land
marks dilemma is that landmark ownership in downtown areas of
high land value is markedly less profitable than redevelopment
of landmark sites. Hence there is an incessant trade-off - in
jurious to the urban environment - of buildings of unique archi
tectural distinction for glass and steel towers that are crammed
with as much rentable floor area as local zoning permits and as
the market will absorb.
Over the last decade, American cities have adopted a variety
of incentive zoning programs in a determined attempt to expand
their leverage over private land use decisions.5 By modifying the
economics of downtown development, these programs encourage
development decisions that would normally be precluded by the
harsh realities of the marketplace. Where successful, they have
enabled cities to channel development in accordance with municiaccorded formal landmark status, but the Chicago City Council on both occasions
refused to accept the Commission's recommendation. A permit for the building's
demolition was issued in October I97I. See Huxtable, Non-Fables for Our Time,
N.Y. Times, Nov. I4, I97I, § 2, at 22, col. 4.
4 The New York Central Railroad, as owner of the site of the Grand Central
Terminal, sought in the early sixties to lease the air rights over the Terminal to a
developer who in.tended to erect a second Pan-Am type building there. The New
York City Landmarks Commission, however, refused to approve the project on
the ground of its aesthetic incompatibility with the facade of the Terminal, a
designated landmark. The New York Central responded by threatening to over
turn the· Commission's action in the courts, but bankruptcy of its successor com
pany, the Penn Central Company, and the softening of the New York City office
space market have relieved the pressure on the Terminal, at least for the time
being. See Address by Norman Marcus, First Conference on Legal Techniques in
Preservation, in Washington, D.C., May 2, I970 (sponsored by National Trust for
Historic Preservation) [hereinafter cited as Marcus].
5 See THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINIS TRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CoNcrPTS
AND TECHNIQUES 1 25-238 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. I970)
[hereinafter cited
as NEW ZONING] ; Comment, Bonus or Incentive Zoning-Legal Implications, 2I
SYR. L. REv. 895 (1970); cf. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, NEW APPROACHES TO
RESIDENTIAL LAND DEVELOPMENT: A STU DY OF CONCEPTS
Bull. No. 40, 1961).

AND INNOVATIONS

(Tech.
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pally selected urban design policies. Although these programs
differ widely among themselves, they are all premised upon a
trade between the city and the developer. The city relaxes its
zoning bulk restrictions, 6 thereby allowing the developer to build
more profitably by including more rentable floor area in his
project than the prevailing zoning otherwise permits. In return
the developer must either provide a public amenity, such as a
plaza, at his own expense or make a cash payment that will en
able the city to finance the purchase of a public improvement.
How does the city derive the additional floor area that it allo
cates to the developer? I f the city seeks an amenity, it simply
creates the floor area ex nihilo and bestows it upon the developer
as a so-called "zoning bonus." The amount of the bonus is
calculated to equal or slightly to exceed in value the cost that
the developer incurs in providing the amenity. The case is more
complicated where the city seeks to retain buildings, such as
landmarks, that enrich its character. Recognizing that these
buildings often fail to exhaust the floor area authorized for their
sites under local zoning, the city allows their owners to sell their
unused floor area to developer-owners of other sites, a practice
commonly referred to as the "transfer of development rights."
The cash carrot that results, it is hoped, will induce owners of the
"underimproved" sites to forego demolition of their buildings.
Zoning bonus programs have been enthusiastically received
by private developers and by municipal governments . 7 The re
sponse to these programs in New York City, the nation's most
innovative practitioner of incentive zoning, 8 is illustrative. Almost
every major office or commercial development erected in Man
hattan's central business district since adoption o f the New York
bonus provisions in 1 9 6 1 has included bonus space.9 The City has
employed bonuses to enhance its Broadway theater,1° Lincoln
6 Some communities might also relax use and tower coverage requirements and
coordinate variance procedures for the miscellaneous minor adjustments that are
floor area. Cf. Svirsky, San Francisco:
The Downtown Development Bonus System,
. in NEw ZONING 139, 142-43.
7 But see note 229 infra.

necessitated by the grant of incerased

8

For a review of the various incentive zoning programs that have been adopted

York City, see Burks, City Wants Air Rights to Hop, Skip
and Jump, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1970, § 8, at l, col. l; Gilbert, Saving Land
marks, HIST. PRESERVATION July-Sept. 1970, at 13; Marcus.
or considered in New

9

NEW ZONING 201.
NEW Y OR K, N Y , ZONING RESOLUTION

10

.

(1971).

.

art. VII, ch.

r,

§ 81-00 et seq.

This provision creates a Special Theater District that includes the area

between 4oth and 57th Streets and 6th

and 8th Avenues.

Developers owning

parcels within the District who agree to include a legitimate theater in their
projects may receive an increase of up to 20 per cent in the floor area authorized
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Center,11 and Fifth Avenue retail 12 districts. It is currently bank
ing upon bonuses to induce private developers to provide a coor
dinated network of physical facilities to service the traffic gen
erated by its 10,000,000 square foot World Trade Center.13 And
it has even proposed that bonuses be enrolled in the effort to
encourage the production of moderate and low income housing.1 4
Development rights transfer programs, on the other hand,
have fared poorly. Again the New York experience is instructive.
for their parcels under prevailing zoning. See Weinstein, How New York's Zoning
Was Changed to Induce the Construction of Legitimate Theaters, in NEW

ZONING

13!. Plans for the construction of five theaters pursuant to the provision have
been announced. See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1970, at 39, col.
11

NEW YoRK, N.Y.,

2.

ZONING RESOLUTION

art. VIII, ch.

2,

§ 82-00 et seq.

ZONING RESOLUTION

art. VIII, ch. 7,

87-00 et. seq.

(1971).
12

NEW YORK, N.Y.,

(1971). This provision created a Fifth Avenue Retail District encompassing Fifth
Avenue between 38th and 59th Streets. It mandates that the two lower floors of
any building constructed within the District be used for retail purposes. Developers
who elect to provide more than the minimum retail space will be given additional
floor area to be used for apartments or hotel accommodations.
13

NEW YORK, N.Y.,

ZONING RESOLUTION

art. VIII, ch. 6, § 86-oo et seq.

(1971), creates a Special Greenwich Street Development District encompassing a
29 square block area between the World Trade Center and Battery Park.
District regulations include

a

The

map and a manual which prescribe a firm area net

work of circula.tion features consisting of open and covered arcades, pedestrian
bridges, subway connections, elevated plazas, and the like.

Developers building

within the District will be required to provide some of these features and may
elect to provide others. In return for these features and for payment of sums into
a subway improvement fund, developers will receive increases in the floor area
authorized for their lots and may also be allowed to build towers that cover a
greater amount of lot area than the zoning would otherwise permit.
The District differs in two respects from New York's existing special districts.
First, the desired features have been previously mapped so that every lot owner
knows beforehand which mandatory and optional features he must or may provide
in return for the increased floor area. Second, the area plan is so specific and the
schedule of bonuses so precise that developers need not negotiate with the Plan
ning Department, submit their development plans for site and design review, or
secure a special permit, all of which are a part of the approval procedure under
the regulations applicable to the other districts. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1970, §
8, at

1,

col. 1.

See also Huxtable, Concept P1Jints to 'City of the Future,' N.Y.

Times, Dec. 6, 1970, § 8, at 1, col. 3.
1 4 The

New York Planning Commission proposed the establishment of a Spe

cial Development District on New York's Lower East Side that would contain
2.355 apartments, of which 1,837 would be luxury class and 418, low income class.
Developers were to be given the option either of providing 15 per cent of the units
in their buildings for low income rental or of paying $15.30 per square foot of the
lot area of their parcels into a special fund to be used to acquire public housing
sites. They would have received an additional floor area authorization in return. But
the proposal appears to have died as a result of opposition of community residents
who saw

ft

as a "give-away" to developers and as a disguised means of displacing

low income persons in the area. See N.Y. Times, May 13, 1970, at 40, col.

I.
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Although that city adopted a transfer program in 1968

15

that

was designed to preserve its landmark buildings, the program has

not as yet figured in a single executed transaction.16 A number

of reasons account for its failure to win the confidence of land
mark owners, real estate developers, and title insurers, as well
as at least one member of the New York City Planning Com
mission.17 Inadequate analysis of the economic burdens of land
mark ownership and of the urban design consequences of develop
ment rights transfers have hampered the

program.

Onerous

administrative controls of dubious necessity have dampened the
enthusiasm of the private sector for the program. And wholly
apart from the merits of the New York program itself has been
the uneasiness of its prospective participants concerning the
underlying legality of the transfer mechanism.
The object of this article is to offer a development rights

transfer proposal, referred to herein as the Chicago Plan, 18 that
will provide an effective foundation for municipal landmark pres 
ervation efforts. The article contains three sections. The first de
tails the economic causes behind the grave attrition of America's
urban landmarks and reviews the conventional legislative re
sponses of the nation's cities to this threat. The second analyzes
the use of development rights transfers to preserve urban land
marks, examining the structure and deficiencies of the New York
15

See N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1969, at 34, col. 4; NEw YO RK , N.Y., ZONING RESO

LUTION art. V II, ch. 4, §§ 74-79, 74-791 to -793 (1971).

6
1 One transfer has almost taken place.
All of the formalities relating to the
transfer of the excess floor area of the Amster Yard, a designated landmark, have
been completed, but the transactio n has been stalled by the softening of the New
York office space market. See Huxtable, City Landmark Gets a Chance for Sur
vival, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1970, § 8 , at l, col. l; Marcus.
17 See p. 628 infra.
18
Prior to the demolition of Chicago's Old Stock Exchange Building, the Na
tional Trust for Historic Preservation and the Chicago Chapter Foundation of the
American Institute of Architects commissioned the author and Jared Shlaes, a
real estate consultant, to devise a transfer proposal that would safeguard the Ex
change and Chicago's remaining architectural landmarks. The product of this study
appeared as a report entitled Development Rights Transfers: A Solution to Chi
cago's Landmarks Dilemma (Chicago Chapter Foundation of the American Insti
tute of Architects & National Trust for Historic Preservation, May 13, 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Chicago Report]. The Chicago Report contains a summary
legal and economic analysis of the proposal discussed in this article. It also in
cludes draft amendments to the Illinois Historic Preservation and Zoning Enabling
Acts and to the Chicago Zoning Code that would permit implementation of the
proposal. See Chicago Report apps. I, II & III. The proposed amendments to
the state legislation have since been adopted. See Ill. Pub. A . No. 77-1373 (Ill.
Leg. Serv., Aug. 31, 1971), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § II -13-1 (1969);
Ill. Pub. A. No. 77-1372 (Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 31, 19 71), in part to be codified
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § n-48.2-1A, in part amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
24, § II-48.2-2 & -6 (1969).
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transfer program and then the content of the Chicago Plan. The
third addresses the issues that are likely to arise in a comprehen
sive legal challenge to the validity of the Chicago Plan.
I. THE PROBLEM: THE VANISHING URBAN LANDMARK
A. Economics and Landmark Ownership
The history of Chicago's Old Stock Exchange B uilding illus
trates the economic vulnerability of urban landmarks.

It was

located in Chicago's Loop, an a r ea in which most of the city's
other architectural gems are concentrated and, ominously, an
area of skyrocketing land values.

Its height of thirteen stories

exhausted less than one-third of the approximately forty-five

stories authorized for its site under present zoning regulations.
Hence, it realized a mere fraction of the rental income that a
modern office tower would have r eturned if located o n the same
site. Its m echanical systems, interior space, and exterior walls
were in need of substantial renovation. Even with refurbishing,
moreover, the annual m aintenance costs of the seventy-eight year
old building would probably have exceeded those of its modern
steel and glass competitors. Typical of other turn-of-the-century
buildings, its interior space was carved up with courts, columns
and other structural features that diminished its appeal to large
corporate tenants.19
Chicago's zoning bonus program intensified the Exchange's
vulnerability. Like the programs of other cities, it is intended to
encourage the provision of plazas, arcades, and other amenities.
By awarding enormous premiums for projects occupying a half
block or more,20 however, the program has brought development
19 The competftive disadvantages suffered by urban landmarks should not be
overstated, however. A review of income and operating expense data for Chicago
office buildings revealed that, while maintenance-related expenses
do tend to increase with the age of the building, [they] do not increase at
such a rate as to impose unreasonable burdens upon older buildings as such.

It is not apparent from national averages that buildings over 40 years
old suffer from any striking competitive disadvantage ; indeed, they net
more per square foot than buildings 2 5-40 years old on a national basis,
perhaps because of special characteristics of buildings constructed during
the depression and war years I930-4 5 . Net income before depreciation and
capital charges for buildings over 40 years old is approximately 78% of the
national average for all buildings but tends to approach $r.6o per square
foot, indicating that these older buildings, while somewhat penalized by
their age, are by no means functionally obsolete.
Chicago Report 2r. See E. SHUL TZ & W. SIMMONS, OFFICES IN THE SKY 88
(I959) [hereinafter cited as OFFICES].
20
An example serves to illustrate the extent of these bonuses. CHICAGO ILL.,
,
MUNICIPAL CODE, ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 1 94A, art. 8.5-6(5) (c) (I970) provides:
On any zoning lot, for each floor above the ground floor which is set back
from one or more lot lines, a premium equal to 0.4 times the open area of
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on small lots to a standstill, and hastened the amalgamation of
existing smaller holdings into assemblages that can exploit the
program to best advantage.

Ironically, therefore, the Exchange

was as much the victim of the city's own zoning regulations as
of the speculative motives of the building's owners.21
If the Exchange's owners had been forced to maintain the
Exchange as a landmark, they would thus have suffered several
economic disadvantages.

They would have been prevented from

redeveloping the site or capitalizing on the site's premium value
for assemblage purposes. Designation might also have precluded
the owners from internal modernization of the Exchange that
would have increased its return by increasing its operating effi
ciency. They would also have been unable to obtain mortgage
financing on terms competitive with those extended to the own
ers of properties unencumbered by landmark designation.

Fi

nally, profitable operation of the landmark might have been
eventually endangered as the building continued to age and the
net income from operation progressively declined.22
B. Mumcipal Preservation Ordinances:
An Inadequate R esponse
In light of these factors, the conventional municipal ordi
nance 23 offers scant hope of achieving the preservation of threatthe lot at the level of such floor divided by the gross lot area may be added
to the permissible floor area ratio . . .
The "floor area ratio" (FAR) is an integer prescribed by the ordinance for each
bulk district, which, when multiplied by the area of the zoning lot, gives the
amount of floor area that may be included in a building erected on that lot. Thus,
if the district FAR is 101 the maximum floor space of a building erected on a
lo,ooo square foot lot is 1001000 square feet. However, if the developer of this
lo,ooo square foot site decided to leave 50% of his lot open when he constructed
a building upon it, he would be entitled under the above-quoted provision to
1401000 square feet of floor space. He would receive a premium of 0.4 times 0.5
times the number of initial floors he was entitled to build (0.4 x 0.5 x 20), bringing·
the FAR to 14. While the above-quoted provision theoretically has equal appli
cation to large and small lots, in practice only large projects can benefit from it .
There is little economic advantage in building tall buildings with a small base
since too much of the space on each floor is devoted to nonrentable uses, such as
elevator and support constructions.
21
See note 229 infra.
22 The economic consequences of designation are not entirely negative. Its.
prestige factor could operate to attract stable, high quality tenants and to reinforce
pride of ownership which would be reflected in the marketplace. See Hearings
.

Before the Commission on Chicago Architectural and Historical Landmarks Con
cerning the Designation of the Monadnock Building as an Official Chicaga Land
mark 90 (Apr. 1970) (on file with the Commission on Chicago Historic and
Architectural Landmarks). Moreover, designation makes space in a landmark.
attractive to tenants who wish to avoid relocation and other vagaries of the de
velopment process.
23 State and local landmarks legislation and programs are reviewed in J. MoR-
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ened urban landmarks. The typical ordinance calls for the des
ignation of individual landmarks, such as the Exchange, and
of entire historic districts, such as New Orleans' Vieux Carre.24
The ordinance enumerates the cultural, aesthetic, and historic
criteria that the city landmark commission, often with the advice
of the city planning commission, must take into account in pro
posing designation of individual buildings or historic districts.25
Actual designation, however, generally rests with the legislative
body.26
After designation, permits for demolition or significant alter
ation of individual landmarks or of buildings within historic
districts require the approval of the landmarks commission.27 If

the commission withholds its consent, it then has a grace period 2 8

in which to devise a compromise plan acceptable to the landmark
owner that will safeguard the structure.

If the owner rejects

the plan, some ordinances authorize the commission to deny the
permit outright regardless of economic hardship 29 while others
require approval in such cases.30

In most cities, however, the

RISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (I965 ) ; J. PYKE, LANDMARK P RESERVATION
(Citizens Union Research Foundation, Inc., 1970) ; Wilson, The Response of State
Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 L Aw & CONTEMP. -PROB. No. 3 (to be
published) ; Wolfe, Conservation of Historic Buildings and Areas - Legal Tech
niques, in 2 ABA SECTION ON REAL PROP., .PROBATE, & TRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS
18 (1963); Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the Preservation of
Historic Property, 63 CoLUM L. REV. 708 ( 1 963); Note, The Landmark Problem
in New York, 22 N . Y.U . INTRAMURAL L. R EV. 99 ( 1 96 7 ) ; Comment, Landmark
Preservation Laws: Compensation for Tem porary Taking, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 6 2
.

(1968).

( 1 970) ; Mobile, Ala.
24 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2 1 -64 (a)
Ordinance 87-03 6, Mar. 20, 1 96 2 ; NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE § 65-6 ( 1956) .
( 1970) ; NEW YORK.
25 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2 1-64 (b)
N.Y., AoMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, § 207-r.oh & k ( 1 97 1 ) .
26
See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2 1-64(f) ( 1 9 70 ) . The Ne"
York ordinance allows the Landmark Commission to designate landmarks ; its
decision, however, may be overridden or modified by the Board of Estimate. See
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, § 20 7-2 .of ( 2 ) ( 1 97 1 ) .
27 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2 1-64.I ( 1970) ; NEW YORK,
N.Y., AoMIN. CODE ANN ch. 8-A, §§ 207-4.0 to -8 .o ( 1 97I) ; CHARLESTON, S.C.,
CODE§§ 51-28 to -3 0 ( 1 966 ) .
28
The usual period is 1 8 0 days. See, e.g., Mobile, Ala., Ordinance 87-036,
Mar. 20, 1962 (6 months) ; CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE § 5 1 -3 0 (4) ( 1 9 6 6 ) . But see
Los Angeles, ·Cal., Ordinance 1 2 1 ,971, Apr. 30, 1962 (up to 360 days ) .
29 See, e.g., NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE §
65-10 ( 1 9 56 ) ; CHARLESTON, S. C.,
CODE§ 51-30 ( 1 966) .
30 See, e.g., Mobile, Ala., Ordinance 87-036, Mar. 2 0 , 1962.
The New York City Landmarks Ordinance contains a unique provision that
authorizes outright denial of a permi't for alteration or demolition in the case of
designated landmarks whose owners either receive state or local tax relief or ob
tain a "reasonable return" - identified as a 6% return on the assessed valuation
of the property. NEW YORK, N.Y., AoMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, §§ 207-1 .oq,
.

HARVARD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 85:574

landmark commission has no power after this grace period to
stay the demolition or alteration of a landmark, but can only
recommend that the legislature acquire or condemn the threat
ened building.31
These ordinances have proven useful in preserving both build
hJ.gs that are within historic districts and landmarks that are out
side of high land value areas. These structures usually hold little
interest for speculators because they tend to be smaller, easily
maintained residential structures located in low density zones.
In fact, at times owners of buildings within historic districts will
welcome designation for the prestige it lends to the neighborhood
and for its beneficial impact upon land values there.32 Few owners
of these buildings litigate permit denials because the prospects
for financial gain through demolition or alteration seldom offset
the costs and delays of a legal challenge.33
The picture differs d ramatically for landmarks located on
downtown parcels. The gap between the income potential of
these parcels as presently developed and as improved to their
most profitable use is such that few owners - speculators or
otherwise 34 - warmly embrace designation . The typical response
of an owner who contemplates redeveloping his site is to force
the city's hand by demanding that it either acquire the property
outright or issue a demolition permit forthwith.35
207-8.0 (1971). By setting the return at this relatively low rate, see Comment,
The Landmark Problem in New York, supra note 23, at 107, and requiring the
landmark owner to come forward with rather precise evidence establishing the
economic burden entailed by designation, the ordinance enables the city's Land
mark Commission to exert considerably greater leverage in dealing with landmark
owners than commissions in other cities enjoy.
31 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-64.2 (1970); CHARLESTON,
S.C., CODE § 51-30(7) ( 1966).
32 See, e.g., N. Y. Times, May 2 7 , 1970, at 35, col. 3 ; C hicago Sun-Times, Oct.
22, 1970, at 3, col. 2.
33 In 1970, the author surveyed preservation agencies in 12 representative cities
to obtain the.ir appraisals of the efficacy of their ordinances. The agencies were
generally enthusiastic about their success in administering historic districts, but
many suggested that nonlegal factors, such as those mentioned in the text, ac
counted for their success.
The agencies were far less sanguine about their efforts in safeguarding indi
vidual landmarks. All noted that their city governments assigned a relatively low
priority to historic preservation, especially i f the latter necessitated the expenditure
of general revenues. Few instances of the use of eminent domain or the purchase
of threatened properties on behalf of these agencies were reported. Although at
least four of the cities are authorized by state law to accord real estate tax abate
ment to official landmarks, moreover, only one city was actually doing so.
34 The stakes are so high where downtown properties are concerned that even
those institutions that want to "do the right thing," such as museums, churches
and service organizations, also balk at designation. See The Chicago Style, note 3
supra.
35 The position of the Building Managers of Chicago (BMA) is representative
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The city's options when the gauntlet is thrown down are
not enviable. Even those landmark commissions that have the
power to deny a demolition or alteration permit are unlikely to
do so. The constitutionality of provisions authorizing such de
nials is dubious; 36 moreover, political pressures from downtown
developers make such an action by the commission improbable
in many cities. On the other hand, condemnation is also unlikely.
Other demands of greater priority preclude most cities from
expending the enormous sums required for the acquisition o f
downtown properties.37 Nor would the city's costs end with
of the views of most downtown building owners and managers in the United
States. In the BMA's view:
(WJe can see no way to accomplish [the preservation of urban landmarks]
unless the City, State or Federal Government purchase the property in
question, spend large amounts of money toward rehabilitation and be [sic]
prepared to operate the property, possibly at a loss .
. . . [TJhe more we study the subject . . . the more we are convinced that
the only solution is for a Government agency to purchase the building and
maintain it. The willingness of some Government agency to purchase should
be ascertained before proceedings are instituted to designate a building as
a landmark so as to avoid unnecessary harm to the owner.
Letter from Richard M.

Palmer, President,

BMA,

to

Samuel

A.

Lichtmann,

Chairman, Commission on Chicago Historical and Architectural Landmarks, Aug.
6, 1970. For similar views in New York, see N. Y. Times, May 27, 1970, at 35,
col.3; N.Y. Times, Apr. 29 , 1970, at 27, col. 3.
36

Courts have consistently held that landmark preservation statutes may not

impose undue economic hardships on landmark owners, and that in cases of undue
economic hardship the city must either acquire the building or permit its demoli
tion. See, e.g., People ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 28 Ill. App. 2d 252, 171
N.E. 246 (1960); In re Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557

(1955) ; cf. note 93 infra. Thus, the imposition of permanent landmark status on
a building that is currently unprofitable seems clearly unconstitutional. On the
other hand, the constitu't ionality of ordinances such as New
York's, see note
30 supra , that do allow permanent designation if the landmark

is returning

a net profit of 6% of assessed valuation is less clear. While "undue economic
hardship" is perhaps not normally thought to apply t o ownership of buildings
that return a profit, it is certainly arguable that in cases where the landmark
owner is forced by designation to forego a vastly more profitable sale of his site
the foregone opportunity constitutes such a hardship.

See Comment, The Land

mark Problem in New York , supra note 23, at 104.
37

The Committee feels that the aesthetic value of the Old Stock Exchange
Building does not exceed the relative cost and, in this day of demand to meet
urgent financial needs in other areas, the City of Chicago cannot afford
the luxury of a building as a landmark that, though it may be treasured
for historic value and architectural originality, is too far deteriorated t o
warrant t h e cost o f rehabilitation. T h e Committee is confident that the
.
people of the City of Chicago would want better application of their tax
�ollars for we are convinced of a resultant dollar deficiency if rehabilita
tion were attempted - the building would become known as Chicago's White
Elephant.
Committee on Cu ltural and Economic Development, Special Report Relative to
Designation of the Old Stock Exchange Building 6 (August 1970) (advising the
Chicago City Council to reject the l,andmark Commission's recommendation that
the Old Stock Exchange be designated).
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requ ire sub stan tial .refu rbishing
acquisition. The building may
.
ance . Rem ovmg it from the
in addition to ordinary mai nten
s
city not only the incr ease d taxe
municipal tax roll will deny the
d,38 but also the taxe s. �ur
that the prop osed proj ect wou ld yiel
prop erty . In addition,
rently being returned by the land mark
a n_ioder n str�ct�r.e may
redevelopment of the land mark site with
the city by rev1tahzmg an
benefit the general econ omic healt h o f
entire block or district.39
II. THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC
FRAMEWORK: LANDMARK PRESERVATION
THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFERS

Conventional preservation ordinances have failed to safe
guard urban landmarks because they ignore the economic reali
ties that lie at the heart of the landmarks dilemma. Owners will
not and cities cannot shoulder the full costs o f preservation.
Resolution of this dilemma requires enlarging the present eco
nomic framework to include other p articipants who will them
selves assume a major share of these costs. The most obvious
solution, of course, would be to spread the costs of preservation
to all taxpayers within the city by a general levy.

But political

obstacles rule out this approach at the present time: 40 the corol
lary to the refusal of American cities to spend for preservation 41
is their unwillingness to tax for this purpose.
If preservation efforts are to have any chance of success,
therefore, another basis of cost allocation must be found that
does not threaten to drain the city's general revenues. New York
City's effort to redistribute these costs through development
rights transfers constitutes a giant s tep in this direction.42
date, however, that effort has not borne fruit.

To

A n examination

38 The differences between the taxes presently received
on the Old Stock
Exchange and a new 45-story tower on its site, for example, are estimated at
$640,000 per year. See Conti, supra note 2.
39 Lewis Hill, Commissioner of the Chicago Planning Department and a mem
ber of the Landmark Commission, voted against designation of the Old Stock
Exchange on the ground that:
It remains my judgment that the designation of this building will not con
_
tribute
t<;> the strengthening of LaSalle Street as the great economic center
of the mid-west.
Le ter fro� L:wis W. Hill to Samuel A. Lichtmann, Chairman , Commissi
on on
Chicago H1stoncal and Architectural Landmarks March 17 1971
'
40 See note 33 supra.
See id; c L
lliot, Introduction. t o NEW
at xv (cities lack capital
.
required to mamtam
or enhance amenity level o f urban areas)
42
NEW ORK, N Y.,
art. VII, ch. 4, § § 74_79, 74_791 to
,-793 (1971)y- The d1scuss10n m the following two paragra
phs o f the text is based
, _
on the prov1s1ons of these statutes.

�

'

4�

�

·

ZONlNG

�ON�G RESOLUTION

·
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of the reasons for its lack of success has given rise to the rather
different transfer proposal discussed in this article.

The follow
ing paragraphs summarize the New York transfer program, cata
log its defects, and then turn to a detailed examination of the
Chicago Plan.
A.

Transfers Under the New York Zoning Resolution

New York landmark owners may transfer the authorized b ut
unbuilt floor area of their landmarks to adjacent lots in certain
districts within the city. The "authorized but unbuilt floor area"
that may be transferred is determined by multiplying the lot area
of a landmark by a factor , known as a floor area ratio (FAR),
that differs for the city's various bulk districts.43

From this

product is subtracted the floor area already exhausted by the
An adjacent lot is defined as one that is contiguous

landmark.

to or across a street or intersection from a landmark lot ; it may
also be one of a series of lots that connect with the landmark
lot, provided that all of these lots are in single ownership. Al
though in most zones the floor area of the transferee lot may not
be increased by more than twenty per cent above its authorized
level, no limit is set for trans feree lots in high density commercial
zones. Transfers may be made to one or several lots until the
excess floor area is exhausted. Once transferred, the excess floor
area is irrevocably withdrawn from the authorized floor area o f
the landmark lot.
Procedures for obtaining approval of a proposed transfer
are complex. First, the New York Landmark Commission must
examine the plans for the development which will utilize the
transferred development rights in order to determine whether
the new development's materials, design , scale, and location are
compatible with the landmark. The owners of the landmark and
the transferee lot must then apply to the New York Planning
Commission for preliminary approval of the transfer. Accom
panying this application must be a site plan for both lots show
ing the proposed development o f the adjoining lot, a program for
continuing maintenance of the landmark, and a report o f the
Landmark Commission detailing the effect of the proposed trans
fer upon the landmark. The Planning Commission must then

decide whether the transfer will have unduly detrimental effects
on the occupants of buildings in the vicinity of the transferee
lot and whether the proposed maintenance program will in fact
result in preservation of the landmark. If the Planning Com-

43 For a detailed evaluation of the
system, see OFFICES 280-82; Note;
Building Size, Shape, and Placement Regulations: Bulk Control Zoning Reex
amined, 60 YALE L.J. 506 (1951).

FAR
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mission recommends approval, the application then goes to the
Board o f Estimate, which has final authority to grant or deny
the application.

The difficulties of obtaining transfer approval

are further complicated by the power of the Planning Commission
in certain instances to condition approval of the transfer upon
provision of an amenity by the development rights purchaser;
in these cases, the Planning Commission must approve the pur
chaser's submission for the amenity as well.
Despite the ingenuity evident in its conception, the New
York initiative contains at least five drawbacks that have crip
pled its effectiveness as a v ehicle for a comprehensive municipal
preservation program.

Heading the list is the absence of a ra

tional incentive structure for inducing landowners to agree to
preserve their landmarks.

By limiting development rights trans

fers to adjacent lots, the program imposes severe restraints upon
the potential market for these rights.

Existing zoning in New

York and other cities already permits developers to shift unused
floor area to contiguous parcels.44 Hence, the plan is useful only
44

The New York Zoning Resolution defines the term "zoning lot" to include

the following:
( c) A tract of land, located within a single block, which at the time of
filing for a building permit . . . is designated by its owner or developer as
a tract all of which is to be used, developed, or built upon as a unit under
single ownership. A zoning Jot, therefore, may or may not coincide with a
lot as shown on the official tax maps of the City of New York or on any
recorded subdivision pla·t o r deed.
For the pu rposes of this definition, ownership of a zoning lot shall be
deemed to include a lease of not less than 50 years duration, with an option
to renew such lease so as to provide a total lease of not less than 75 years
duration.
NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. I, ch. 2, § 1 2 -10 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . See CHICAGO,
!LL., MUNICIPAL CODE, ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 194A, art. 3.2 ( 1 9 70) . Under these
provisions a developer may increase the authorized floor area on the project site
by obtaining a long-term lease on an underimproved or vacant adjacent site,
designating both that site and the project site as a single "zoning lot,'' and shifting
the unused floor area from the former to the latter.
One hundred thousand square feet of excess floor area authorized for the site
of the Appellate Division Courthouse, a New York landmark, were t ransferred to
an adjacent project site pursuant to § 12-10 and without the aid of § 74-79, the
landmark transfer provision, which, at the time of the transaction, was not appli
cable to publicly owned landmarks. A developer, desiring to incorporate the ad
ditional floor area into his project on the adjacent site, leased the landmark prop
erty for a 50-year period with a 25-year renewal option, then subleased it back
to the City reserving the 100,000 square feet of floor area. The operative clause
of the lease provides :
Section 4.oI. ( a) Tenant is hereby given the right, prior to or during the
Demised Term, to combine the zoning lot of the Demised Premises with the
zoning lot of the Adjoining Premises, so as to obtain a combined Floor
Area Ratio . . . for the zoning lots of the Demised P remises and the Ad
j oining Premises ; however, as a result of such combination of zoning lots,
Tenant shall not obtain more than one hundred thousand ( 1 00,000) square
feet of floor area from the zoning lot of the Demised P remises.
Lease between the City of New York and 41 Madison Company § 4.or (a) , Apr.
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when a developer can be found who happens to own a lot located
across a street or an intersection from a landmark or when a
landmark owner who owns a series o f lots that connect with the
landmark lot desires to build on one or more of those lots. Under
the plan, moreover, the market value of the rights is controlled
wholly by the vagaries of construction activity within the imme
diate vicinity of the landmark . Thus, while the transfer of, for ex
ample, two hundred thousand square feet of floor space may com
mand a premium if the landmark adjoins the site of a projected
skyscraper, that space may be worthless if no construction is
contemplated on the sites adjacent to the landmark. Nor does the
plan offer a secure basis for p redicting that the income received
from the transfer of development rights in any given instance
will equal or exceed rather than fall short of the economic bur
dens of landmark ownership.

As pointed out earlier,45 these

burdens are attributable to a variety o f factors in addition to
the unused development potential o f the landmark site. Physical
and functional obsolescence, assemblage value, and impairment
of mortgageability and feasibility o f renovation are only some of
these additional factors. In a limited number of instances, more
over, the landmark may already utilize virtually all of the floor
area authorized for its site.46

Finally , the New York plan fails

to provide supplementary funding for those cases in which de
velopment rights sales do not promise full compensation.
The second weakness of the New York plan lies in its laby
rinthine procedures governing the issuance of transfer permits.
The maze of discretionary approvals based upon vague aesthetic ,
planning, and urban design criteria are hardly calculated to at
tract the voluntary participation o f developers and landmark
owners. These permits, moreover, are issued

after

formal desig

nation has occurred. Yet the battle to safeguard threatened build
ings of landmark quality is often lost at the designation stage
itself. Owners of proposed landmarks typically oppose designa
tion in response to their quite reasonable fears concerning its
economic impact. Local governing bodies, too, have proven re
luctant to designate buildings of unquestioned landmark status,
as the Exchange debacle itself illustrates.47 This reluctance may
stem either from the potent political influence of downtown real
tor and developer groups, who generally oppose meaningful pres10, 1970. See Sher, 'Air Rights' Lease, Zoning, 164 N.Y.L.J. Oct. 9 , 1 9 70, at 1 ;

N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1 9 70, at 34, col.

i.
Sher notes that the method is "used
commonly by private developers." Sher, supra, at 2 .
45

See pp. 579-80 supra.

46

An example is the Monadnock Building, Chicago's last and tallest
scraper of masonry construction, which was designed by John Root.
47

See note 3 supra.

sky
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ervation programs, 48 or from a concern for the eventual fiscal
c onsequences that designation would entail for the city.49 If
approval of an equitable incentive package, including an appro
priate transfer authorization, were included in the designation
process, it seems likely that the resistance o f landmark owners
and local governing bodies would lessen.
A third difficulty with the plan is its reliance upon the volun
tary participation of landmark owners. They may balk, because
they question the legality o f the plan or the marketability of the
development rights, because they are developers who wish to pro
ceed with redevelopment o f the landmark s ite, or for any number
o f other reasons. Without their participation, of course, the pros
pects for preservation revert to their former unhappy state.
Fourth, it can be questioned whether the New York initiative
adequately insures that the landmarks o f participating landown
ers will in fact be preserved. Relying essentially upon the trans
fer o f some or all o f a landmark's floor area for this purpose is
u nnecessarily risky. Under the New York plan a landmark own
er apparently retains the right to demolish his landmark and
replace it with a building o f equivalent bulk if he decides that
redevelopment would be more profitable.50

In addition , a subse

quent increase in the FAR o f the district in which the landmark
is located would rekindle speculative interest in the property ;
by recreating the excess floor area that had previously been
transferred, it would give the owner an incentive to replace his
landmark with a larger structure. The New York plan also lacks
a mechanism that precisely defines the obligations assumed by
the present and future owners o f the landmark in consequence

48

See note 3 5 supra.

49

See pp. 583-84 & notes 3 7-3 9 supra.

Gilbert, Secretary of the New York Landmarks Preservation
50 Mr. Frank
Commission, suggests that development rights transfers would discourage but not
prohibit the destruction of the landmark :
[W) hen completed, [a development rights transfer) reduces much of the
economic pressure to tear down the landmark since i t could be replaced
only by another building with the same amount of

floor

space.

Gilbert, supra note 8, at 14 (emphasis added ) .
The absence of an express requirement that a landmark owner convey an
intereit in the property obligating himself and future owners not to demolish or
alter the landmark also points in this direction. Either § 74-791, which calls for
a "program for . . . continuing maintenance," or § 74-793 , which requires filing
at the county registry of " [n) otice of the restrictions upon further development"
of the landmark and transferee lots might be construed to include the conveyance
of a preservation restriction. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII,
ch. 4, § § 74-791 , -793 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . But both are extremely vague. Significantly, no
such restriction was contemplated in the Amster Yard transaction, discussed in
note 16 supra.

LANDMARKS PRESERVA TION
of the transfer authorization and that affords the city an effec
tive remedy for the breach of these obligations.
Finally, the adjacency limitation of the New York plan need
lessly produces a number of unfortunate urban design conse
quences.

First,

mammoth

concentrations of bulk within

the

compass of a block or less 51 might lead to an excessive demand
for municipal services and to traffic congestion in the vicinity of
the landmark.

Second, a landmark building might be suffocated

in adjacent superdensity, the visual enjoyment of a landmark
being blotted out by the tall buildings around it. New York has
responded to these risks by encasing development rights transfers
in the straightjacket of administrative controls discussed above.
But these controls have served only to deaden the enthusiasm of
landmark owners and developers whose participation in the plan
is absolutely essential to its success.

B.
r.

The Chicago Plan

A n Overview. - The

discussion o f the plight of the Old

Stock Exchange Building touched upon four characteristics that
are fairly common among urban landmarks throughout the United
States. First, most utilize only

a

fraction of the floor area author

ized for their sites under modern zoning. Second, most landmarks
are currently able to operate at a profit ; 52 their imperilment
stems from the greater value o f their land as the site of large
office or commercial structures.53 Third, endangered landmarks
tend to be grouped in one or more reasonably compact areas o f
the city, usually i n high land value commercial and service dis
tricts.

Finally, municipal facilities and supportive services are

also most heavily concentrated in these districts. This network
of public facilities and services enables these districts to absorb
51

The magnitude of density is enormous in the case of certain New York

landmarks.

For example, the excess development rights of the

United States

Customs House are 789,800 square feet, an amount equal to the floor area of the
60-story Woolworth Building. See B u rks, supra note 8, at 9, col. 5 .
52

See notes 1 9 & 22 supra.

53

The impact of rising land values on existing downtown development has

been described as follows :
In our . big cities of a half million or more population, [the] demolition of
older structures was made economically feasible by parabolic increases in
land val�f:S· As � matter of fact, there are very few parcels of land in our
largest cities which have not had as many as three different structures
on
. the
them in
last hundred years
. . . Our megalopolitan cities have grown
so fast, however, that we have seen 25-year periods . . . where
the land
value has increased so rapidly that it has become economic
to demolish even
a fairly new building in order to use the land more intensivel
y - to exploit
.
.
to its highest and best use the new land value created in a
short span of time.
Nelson, Appraisal of Air Rights, 23 APPRAISAL J.
495 ( 1 955) [hereina fter cited
Air Rights] (emphasis added ) .
.

as
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large numbers of people with greater efficiency than other areas
o f the city.
The Chicago Plan attempts to avoid the drawbacks of the
New York plan through recognition of these factors.

Briefly,

the Plan would operate as follows. The city council, upon recom
mendation of the landmark and planning commissions, would
establish one or more " development rights transfer districts," 54
which would roughly c o incide with the areas where downtown
landmarks are concentrated.

Upon designation of his landmark

or at any time thereafter, the landmark owner would b e entitled
to transfer its development rights to other lots within the transfer
district in which the landmark is located and to receive a real
estate tax reduction reflecting the reduced value of his property.
Transfers may be made to one or more transferee lots provided
that the constructive lot area of any transferee lot is not increased
by more than fifteen p e r cent.55

Transfers would be subject to

additional planning controls set forth in the municipality's pres
ervation ordinance. In return for this transfer authorization, the
owner would be required to convey to the city a "preservation
restriction," which would bind him and future owners of the
landmark to maintain i t in accordance with reasonable standards
and to refrain from demolishing o r altering it without the city's
permission.
Should a landmark owner reject the transfer option, the city
would step in and condemn a preservation restriction and the
landmark's development rights, though, in exceptional cases, the
city might choose to condemn the landmark property in fee. Ac
quisition costs and other expenses o f the program would be funded
through a municipal "development rights bank." The bank would
be credited with development rights that have been condemned
from recalcitrant owners, rights donated by owners o f other land
marks, and rights transferred from publicly owned landmarks.
The city would sell these pooled development rights as necessary
54 A

development rights

transfer

district should not

traditional historic district referred to at p . 5 8 1 supra.
trict,

it serves as a marketing

area

for development

be

confused

with the

Unlike the historic dis
rights and

contains only

a small number of buildings of significant architectural or historic character in
relation to the total number of buildings within its boundaries .

In addition, the

municipal landmark commission reviews only those applications for alteration or
demolition that relate to designated individual landmarks within a transfer dis
trict.

In contrast, the commission engages i n building permit review with respect

to all buildings within historic districts.
55

The figure of

r s o/o

was concurred in by municipal planners and architects

in Chicago who viewed it as low enough to p rotect against the risk of urban design
abuse, but not so low as to deprive the plan of economic appeal for landmark
owners.

Other cities may wish to increase or decrease this figure on the basis of

their peculiar urban design needs and preferences.
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to meet program costs, subject to the same planning controls that
apply to private owners.
As outlined above, the Chicago Plan redistributes preservation
costs equitably and realistically.

Transfer authorizations - o r

cash awards, i f the city is forced to condemn the property - and
tax relief compensate the landmark owner for his losses.

Elimi

nating the property's development potential by acquisition of the
preservation restriction decreases the value of the site and ex
tinguishes speculative interest in it.

Landmarks will remain in

private hands as vital commercial or office buildings instead o f
undergoing mummification as museums.

Hence, the city avoids

outlays for fee acquisition, restoration, and maintenance, and
may continue to tax the landmark property, although at a lesser
rate. Moreover, these tax losses will be more than offset by in
creased tax yields from the larger buildings authorized by the
transferred development rights. And, in return for their financial
contribution to the landmarks program, downtown developers
receive full value in the form o f governmental licenses to build
larger structures than local zoning otherwise permits.
In addition to safeguarding threatened landmarks, the Chi
cago Plan promises to expedite downtown development gener
ally by easing the difficulties of land assembly. Developers who
have assembled all but a small fraction of a unified tract would
be permitted to fill out the remainder by purchasing development
rights from landmark owners or from the municipal development
rights bank. This privilege would be subject, of course, to appro
priate safeguards - again set out in advance in the preservation
ordinance - concerning light, air and other design features o f
these projects. A t the present time, developers often obtain bulk
variances on spurious legal grounds 56 or spend months or years
trying to acquire the additional strip needed to make their project
economically feasible.57
2.

The Elements of the Chicago Plan: A Closer Examination.

- a. The Incentive Package. - Unlike the New York program,

the Chicago Plan is designed to compensate the landmark owner
for the actual losses that he suffers. Prior to proposing designa
tion of a landmark, the landmark commission will obtain an
appraisal of the property that details the economic consequences
of designation. The appraisal will also enumerate any structural
defects, restoration or rehabilitation problems, or unique main
tenance problems that further intensify the burdens of private
ownership. The commission will then devise a package to com56 See authorities cited in note 2or
57 See

Air Rights

497.

infra.

The author is personally familiar with

a number of

land assemblies in Chicago that required from four to six years to complete.
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pensate the owner that will include an authorization to transfer
up to one hundred per cent of the landmark's lot area and an
appropriate real estate tax reduction. Transfers under the Chi
cago Plan will be measured in terms of lot area rather than floor
area,6 8 since the introduction of zoning bonuses and other com
plications into modern zoning codes makes lot area, rather than
floor area, the factor that developers use to calculate the size
and volume of projected developments.59 An additional subsidy,
funded out of the municipal development rights bank, may be
included to cover losses not met by the package and to deal with
special difficulties affecting the building.
The real estate tax reduction, an integral element of the Chi
cago Plan, should prove especially attractive to landmark own
ers.60 The impact of a real estate tax reduction can be dramatic
because real estate taxes are the largest single item in the cost
of operating downtown buildings .61 A study recently undertaken
in Chicago, for example, concluded that a twenty-five per cent
reduction in the assessed valuation of downtown office buildings
would result in a tax saving equal to twice the average repairs
and maintenance budget for such properties.62 These savings
alone will compensate the owners of many landmarks for their
losses.63 Since tax reductions under the Plan will be geared to
the drop in appraised value that landmark properties suffer as a
58 The Chicago Plan uses the same technique - combination of the lot area

of the landmark and project sites - that was used in the Appellate Division
Courthouse transaction. See note 44 supra. It does not entail the transfer of
"air rights." The latter are a property interest in a three-dimensional location
in space. Development rights, on the other hand, are simply a governmental license
to build a defined amount of floor area as measured by the amount of lot area
that has been constructively "transferred" to the project site.
59 Another difference between the New York and Chicago Plans concerns the

permanence of a development rights transfer.

Transfers of development rights
See NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION
art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-792 (4) ( 1971) . Under the transfer proposal, on the other
hand, landmark owners may be authorized by the municipal landmark com
mission and city council to pu rchase additional development rights to use on their
sites if their buildings are destroyed by natural or other casualty occurrences be
yond their cont rol.
60 Real estate tax relief is not included in the New York plan as such. The
New York Landmarks Act, N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 96(a) (McKinney Supp.
1970) and the Preservation of Landmarks and Historical Districts Ordinance,
NEW YoRK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, § 207-8.oa ( z ) ( 19 7 1 ) both au
thorize tax abatement. But the latter has not yet been extended to New York
landmark owners, either generally or in conjunction with development rights
are "irrevocable" in New York.

transfers.
61 OFFICES 123.
62 Chicago Report 22 .
63 Id. at 1 $ .

1972]
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result of permanent designation, these reductions can be expected
to equal or exceed the twenty-five per cent figure in a large num
ber of instances.
b. Preservation Restriction. - Under the Chicago Plan, mu
nicipalities will obtain a preservation restriction in landmark
properties except in the rare case when fairness requires that
the city acquire a property in fee.64 The advantages o f less-than
fee acquisition are substantial . By this means, government limits
its interference with private ownership, yet secures the preserva
tion of landmarks. The latter continue in their original use or
in an adaptive reuse that serves the space needs of the downtown
area. The condemnation award will be reduced ; maintenance
and restoration costs are borne by the owner aided, in appropri
ate cases, by subsidies from the development rights bank; and
the landmark property remains on the tax rolls.
Other advantages of preservation restrictions may also be
cited. The preservation restriction enables landmark owners to
qualify for federal 65 and state 66 income tax and local 67 real
estate tax benefits that they might not otherwise enjoy. It also
allows for more precise regulation of the obligations o f landmark
ownership. While these obligations can also be defined to some
extent by general ordinance, as in New York, the interests of
the city and the landmark owner are better served by an instru
ment that has been carefully tailored to take account of the
peculiarities of individual properties . Finally, the preservation
restriction offers accurate notice to mortgagees, purchasers, and
other interested parties of the encumbrances attaching to the
landmark property.68
6
as

4 This will be the case when the economic burdens of landmark ownership,

a result of an individual landmark's structural unsoundness, functional obsoles

cence or other cause, rise to such a level that its profitable operation is impossible.
65 A preservation restriction may help to ensure that donors of development
rights to the development rights bank receive a federal charitable deduction. See
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170 ; Rev. Ruling 64-205, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 62. See

also R. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN LAND

ch. 5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BRENNEMAN] . Presently under consideration is
a change in the federal income tax laws that would liberalize· guidelines for
qualifying donations of preservation restrictions as charitable deductions. Address
by Kenneth Gemmill, First Conference on Legal Techniques in Preservations, in
Washington, D.C., May 2, 1970 (sponsored by National Trust for Historic Pres
ervation) .

66 Twenty-six states have a personal i ncome tax base that is derivative of the

federal income tax base. Hence, charitable deductions taken under the latter may
be included under the former as well. Address by Kenneth Gemmill, supra note 6 5 .
6 7 The exis.tence o f a preservation
restriction would have probative value in
showing a lower appraisal value of property. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 24,
§ n-48.2 -6 ( 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-27-14 (Supp. 1 9 71 ) .
68
The adequacy of existing recording indexes for this purpose, however, has
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c. The Development Rights Transfer District. - The adja
cency restriction is a principal culprit in the failure of the New
York initiative to win the support of the real estate industry and
of landmark owners. It severely impairs the marketability of
development rights. It scatters density throughout the city on
the capricious principle of how closely proposed developments
border on landmarks. And it necessitates burdensome design re
view procedures to insure that landmark buildings are not over
whelmed by adjacent behemoths.69
The Chicago Plan dispenses with the adjacency requirement
by permitting transfers to any property within the development
rights transfer district in which the landmark is located. This
approach promises to avoid the economic and planning difficulties
that have crippled the New York plan. The market for develop
ment rights under the Chicago Plan should prove more lucrative
than the market under the New York plan on two counts. First,
transfer districts are likely to encompass the high land value
been questioned on two grounds. First, the absence of an index specifically de
voted to public restrictions complicates title searches on landmark properties.
Second, in the absence of special legislation, recorded preservation restrictions are
subject to termination pursuant to state obsolete restrictions and marketable title
acts. See note 1 6 7 infra.
6 9 The adoption of the adjacency restriction in New York, despite these
drawbacks, was motivated by a desire to fit development rights transfers into
the legal rationale that purportedly justifies the award of zoning bonuses. See
Marcus. The latter, it will be recalled, are granted in return for an amenity .
Located on the same lot as the oversize building, the amenity, it is claimed,
"digests" the building's extra floor area by providing additional light and air
or by facilitating the movement of traffic generated by the building. This rationale
thus answers the concern of city planners that the increased intensity of use re
sulting from the granting of zoning bonuses will be absorbed by the amenity for
which ·the bonus was given. See generally DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, SAN
FRANCISCO DOWNTOWN ZONING STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1966 ) ; Ruth, Economic
Aspects of the San Franlisco Zoning Ordinance Bonus System, in NEW ZONING
159; Svirsky, supra note 6. Landmarks, too, are viewed as amenities in the form
of so many "light and air parks." See Marcus. But they obviously cannot be
located on the same lot as the building to which their excess floor area has been
transferred. If they are to digest this additional density, it is thought, they must
be as close to the building as possible. Hence, the origin of the adjacency restriction .
While the adjacency restriction thus fits within the digestion rationale, th e
advantages of this rationale may be more apparent than real. It has not received
express judicial approval. Moreover, the rationale seems more metaphorical than
legal in content since it is difficult to conceive of an operational test that indi
cates how much light and air is needed to "digest," let us say, 50,000 additional
square feet of office space. In addition, the digestion rationale is demonstrably in
adequate as an explanation for some types of incentive zoning. Amenities such
as theaters, see note IO supra, or retail stores, see note 1 2 supra, will actually
increase traffic at the project site.
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areas of the city since, as already noted , 70 threatened urban land
marks tend to be grouped in such areas. It can be assumed that
municipalities will capitalize on this advantage in drawing the
boundaries of their development rights transfer districts. Second,
the marketability of development rights will not be dependent
upon the vagaries of construction activity on sites immediately
adjacent to landmarks. They will be governed instead by the
general vigor of the construction and real estate markets in the
particular municipality's central commercial and service areas.
The area-wide approach, as conceived under the Chicago Plan,
also p romises to minimize the undeniable risk of urban design
abuse that attends any incentive zoning program. It will do so
by means of controls that govern the establishment of develop
ment rights transfer districts and that regulate transfers that
subsequently take place within these districts. Prior to recom
mending the establishment o f any district , the municipal land
mark and planning commissions will prepare a study of the area
in question that inventories the number and type o f prospective
landmarks there ; that estimates the amount of floor area - over
and above that already authorized for the area under present
zoning - that might be transferred upon designation of the land
marks ; and that details the capacity of the area's public services
and facilities to absorb this additional density. In addition, the
planning commission will review the compatibility of the proposed
district with the municipality's comprehensive plan and its de
tailed plan, if any, for the area. This study and the accompanying
recommendation of the two agencies will provide the basis for
the local governing body's decision to establish the district and
to determine its boundaries.
Once established, transfer districts will be protected from
undue concentrations of density in at least three respects. First,
an upper bound on the amount of lot area that may be transferred
within a district is fixed by the number of designated landmarks
there. That number is not likely to be excessive in absolute
terms: Chicago's architecturally-rich Loop area, for example, will
probably have no more than thirty designated landmarks. Nor
will all of the landmarks within a district incur substantial de
preciation upon designation. Measured against the size of the
district and its capacity to absorb density, therefore, the total
amount of transferable density is likely to be marginal.71
70 See p. 582 supra.
71 I t is estimated that the transfer of some 300,000 feet of lot area, coupled
with appropriate tax reductions, will be sufficient to fund a preservation program
for the landmark buildings in Chicago's Greater Loop area. See Chicago Report
20. Because the scope of the program is so limited, concern that a city will be
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Second, most if not all of the floor area that will be added to
new projects under the Chicago Plan will already have been
authorized by existing zoning.

The main thrust of the Plan,
therefore, is upon the redistribution of previously authorized
floor area rather than upon the creation of w holly new floor area
as in the case of zoning bonuses.

Hence, the Plan will occasion

little or no net increase in presently authorized density of the
distri c t. 1 2
Third, the proposal envisages that transfers will be restricted
to selected use and bulk districts - essentially high density com
mercial and apartment zones - within the development rights
transfer district, and that no transferee site m ay be increased by
more than fifteen per cent o f its actual lot area. These limitations
will further minimize the possibilities of urban design abuse.
Preliminary indications are that the principal buyers of develop
ment rights will be developers of smaller interior lots in commer
cial zones that cannot practicably utilize zoning bonuses and of
lots devoted to high-rise apartment developments.73

Such shifts

in density are unlikely to distort the cityscape within the transfer
district. With the advent o f the skyscraper and the absence of
stringent height limitations, the American cityscape has assumed
a distinctly i rregular form best exemplified by the Manhattan
skyline.

Sprinkling an additional four to six stories on lots in

these centrally located districts will make little difference in such
a setting.74
engulfed in surplus density is misplaced. But proposals have been made that
would escalate development rights transfers to a level that might produce this
result. For example, Ira Duchan, New York City Commissioner of Real Estate,
has suggested that excess floor area be transferable to nonadjacent sites from any
building or facility owned by the city. See Burks, sup ra note 8.
72 Under the New York plan, no net increase in density can occur because
transfer of only the authorized but unused floor area is allowed from any land
mark site. See p. 584 supra. A net increase is theoretically possible under the
transfer proposal, however, because transfers of up ·to 100% of a landmark's
lot area may be authorized in . appropriate cases. But data compiled in the Chi
cago Report indicate that a net increase in the density of a transfer district is
highly improbable. Relatively few landmarks are likely to incur such grave
depreciation that only a full 100% transfer authorization over and above real
estate tax relief will promise to compensate their owners fairly. See Chicago
Report 1 2-1 5 . In fact, tax relief alone will be sufficient to compensate landmark
owners in many cases. Id. at 2 1-2 2 . Nor should it be anticipated that all of
the lot area pooled in the municipal development rights bank will be put on the
market. On the contrary, only an amount necessary to provide supplementary
funding for the municipal preservation program will be transferred. Id. at 20.
7 3 See Chicago Report 16-19.
74 As described in the text, development rights transfer districts would roughly
coincide with geographic areas of the city in which urban landmarks are concen
trated. In this way an urban design tradeoff is achieved: bulk within the district
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The municipality 's role

under the New York plan is both too little and too great.

It is

too little because the city must expend its own scarce revenues to
safeguard threatened landmarks if the development rights carrot
fails to entice landmark owners. And it is too great because the
plan's labyrinth of discretionary approvals tends to discourage
owners and developers from electing to participate in the pro
gram at all.
The Chicago Plan directly addresses both of these problems .
As to the first, it enables the municipality to finance a vigorous
preservation program without dipping into general revenues. Sales
of development rights from the municipal development rights
bank should provide the financial basis for effective public inter
vention in whatever form individual cases may require.
Development rights credited to the bank will derive from
three sources. The principle source will be landmark owners who
decline the transfer option and insist that the city pay them a
is redistributed in exchange for the increased amenity resulting from the presence
of low density structures there. Moreover, the bulk restrictions of the traditional
bulk zones within the district are left unchanged.
A second approach is conceivable under which transfer districts would coincide
with areas that, though presently zoned to relatively low densities, are expected
to undergo intensive development soon. Whether or not these areas contain land
marks would be irrelevant. In rezoning them to the greater densities warranted
by development expectations, densities permitted as of right would be deliberately
skewed to levels falling somewhat short of the total amount of density that the
market could absorb and that would be consistent with community health and
safety. Developers within these areas would be permitted to p urchase the re
maining density increments from landmark owners, wherever located, or from the
municipal development rights bank.
A proposal for restoring the Georgetown Waterfront Historic District has been
advanced along these lines. P remised on the expectation that the stringent height
limitations presently in force in downtown Washington will be removed, it would
enable owners of property within the Historic District to sell development rights
to developers within the downtown Washington area, the receipts of these sales
being used to upgrade the Historic District. See Von Eckardt , Get ting Charm and
Height, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1971, § C, at r , col. 5 .
Unlike the Chicago Plan, this alternative method is open t o serious due process
challenges. As will be shown later, the existence of the Chicago Plan casts n o
doubt on the underlying reasonableness o f the bulk restrictions that remain i n
effect on nontransferee lots in the development rights transfer district, see pp.
628-31 infra. Under the alternative, h owever, communities have conceded that
the bulk levels permitted as of right in the transfer district are below those that
would pose a threat to public health and safety.
That the landowners may nevertheless obtain what the courts may deem a
"reasonable return" on their property is not a sufficient answer t o this objection.
In addition to meeting the reasonabl e return criterion, communities adopting
these programs must also convince the courts that the development potential of
private property may be regulated under the police power to raise funds or other
wise provide compensation for public improvements that government is unable to
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cash award for their losses.75 The bank will receive an increment
of lot area in such cases equal to the value of the award but in
no event greater than one hundred per cent of the landmark
site. A second source will be other landmark owners who donate
lot area. That such donations will be forthcoming is highly prob
able in view of the tangible federal, state, and local tax benefits
that donors will enjoy and, perhaps more importantly, in light of
the central role that private philanthropy has traditionally played
in the American preservation movement. The third will be the
city itself, which is likely to own a fair number of the community's
landmarks . The bank would be credited in the last two instances
with increments of lot area proportional to the authorized but
unbuilt floor area of the landmarks.
The lion's share of the city's preservation costs will be cov
ered by the sale of condemned development rights.

But addi

tional funds will be necessary for subsidies and for the relatively
infrequent cases in which the transfer authorization-tax reduction
package fails to provide adequate compensation.

Donated de

velopment rights and those provided by the city should provide
an ample cushion in these cases.
The Plan also seeks to simplify the administrative procedures
governing development rights transfer authorizations . The prob
lem here is to strike a correct balance between preventing urban
design abuse through proper planning controls and facilitating
the marketability of development rights by freeing them of oner
ous restrictions. Under its program New York has little choice
finance through general tax revenues.

That question will be resolved affirmatively

only if the courts are prepared frankly to extend the general welfare concept in
the incentive zoning context to include fiscal

as

well as regulatory objectives.

Whether the cou rts will take this step at the present time is unclear.

7 5 Some commentators have intimated that an award of development rights

alone may be sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement of just compensa
tion that incentive zoning programs may trigger.

Professor Mandelker, for ex

ample, speaks of zoning bonuses as " a de facto quid pro quo for corresponding
increases in development costs ."

Mandelker, The Basic Philosophy of Zoning:
Incentive or Res train t ? , in NEW ZONING 1 6 . Norman Marcus has suggested that

the availability o f the transfer option might make it more difficult for landmark
owners to establish that landmark restrictions deprive them of a reasonable return
on their property. See Marcus. While this view may be acceptable in some juris

dictions, see generally Haar & Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land
Acquisition, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 833 ( 1 963 ) , it is open to two objections in others.
First, the jurisdiction may require that compensation for the interest taken be in
cash . See, e.g., 3 P. NICHOLS , NICHOLS' THE LAW

OF

rev. ed. 1970)

Department of Pub. Works v.

[hereinafter cited as NICHOLS] ;

Caldwell, 301 Ill. 242 , 133 N .E. 642

( 1 92 1 ) .

EMINENT DOMAIN

§ 8.2 (3d

Those jurisdictions that do pennit

special benefits to be set off against the interest taken might nevertheless regard
development rights as having too uncertain a value to merit recognition as a form
of special benefits.
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but to err on the side of the former.

Because every transfer

shifts bulk to a site adjacent to a landmark, its aesthetic i mpact
on the landmark must be examined on an individualized basis
and in terms of highly subjective criteria.

Moreover, the New

York program provides no assurance beforehand that the physi
cal services and facilities in the landmark's immediate area will
be able to absorb the additional density resulting from the trans
fer. This uncertainty, too, necessitates case-by-case review.
The Chicago Plan largely avoids both problems by permitting
transfers throughout development rights transfer districts. Few,
if any, transfers under the Plan will be to sites adj acent to land
marks because the number o f potential transferee sites is vastly
expanded and because most cities already permit such transfers

as

of right under conventional zoning provisions. Except in the

rare cases when such transfers occur, therefore, no need for de
sign review exists. Further, development rights transfer districts
are selected expressly upon the basis of the capacity of their
public services and facilities to absorb any increased density that
may be allocated within them under the Plan.

Preselecting the ·

districts in this way also enables the city to dispense with case
by-case review.

The remaining controls envisaged under the

Plan, such as the limitations concerning bulk and use districts
to which transfers may be made and the permitted increases in
the size of transferee lots, will be set forth in advance in the
preservation ordinance and need not, therefore, be administered
on a discretionary basis. An additional advantage of the Chicago
Plan is that it telescopes into a single proceeding the separate
proceedings in New York. By this means, it will tend to reduce
the resistance of owners and city councils to the formal designa
tion of landmark buildings.76
e.

Implementation of the Chicago Plan.

-

The Chicago Plan

employs zoning techniques to advance preservation obj ectives ;
thus it could be implemented either as a zoning or as a preserva
tion measure. This choice will determine whether municipal au
thority to adopt the Plan should o riginate in state zoning or state
preservation enabling legislation and whether the zoning or the
preservation ordinance should be the primary tool for its imple
mentation at the municipal level. It may also shape the relative
influence of the local planning and landmark commissions in
administering the Plan.
The American Law Institute's Model Land D ev elopment
Code 77 offers an ideal solution. Intended to serve as a compre
hensive state enabling act to empower local communities to regu76 See pp. 58 7-88 supra .

77

ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT ConE (Tent. Draft No.

2,

1 9 70) .
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late land use and development, the Code treats zoning 78 and
preservation 79 as two categories of this regulatory power. It
thereby recognizes the close ties of technique and objective that
zoning and preservation share,80 but does not ignore their sep
arate identities. It envisages adoption a t the local level of a
single Land Development Ordinance 81 to be administered by a
single Land Development Agency.82 Under this arrangement, the
Plan could serve as one component of the Ordinance, which is
intended to address a variety o f land use concerns on a coordi
nated basis. "Ultimate responsibility" 83 for administering the
Ordinance - and thus the Plan - would rest with the Agency, an
entity that most resembles the municipal planning commission.
But landmark commissions would likely play an influential role
as well in view of the Code draftsmen's suggestion that the
Agency "delegate the administration of historic and other spe
cial preservation regulations to specialized bodies expert in archi
tecture and planning." 84
The Code, unfortunately, is still adrafting, and resort must
be had to a less satisfactory approach. Two alternatives are sug
gested by the existing legislative framework that governs zoning
and preservation matters. First, the Plan might be treated essen
tially as a p reservation undertaking : authority to adopt it would
appear in the state preservation enabling act ; its mechanics would
78 Id. Art. 2 .
7 9 Id. § § 2-208 to -209.
8 0 Municipal preservation efforts have been upheld as a manifestation of local
zoning powers.

City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 41 0, 415,

3 89 P .2 d 13, 17 ( 1 964) . They have been deemed "au xiliary to the general zoning
power" in states having independent preservation enabling acts.

Rebman v. City

of Springfield, 1 1 1 Ill. App. 2 d 430, 440, 2 50 N.E.2d 2 8 2 , 2 8 7 ( 1 969) . Many munic
ipalities incorporate some o r all of their preservation measures in their zoning ordi
nances. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ZoNING RESOLUTION art. 1 , ch. 1 , § n-121 ;
art. 2 , ch. 1, § 2 1-00 ; art. 2 , ch. 3 , § 23-6 9 ; art. 7, ch. 4, §§ 74-7 1 , 74-79 (1971) ;

CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE ch. 5 1 , art. III ( 1 966 ) .

Some state legislatures have

expressly authorized municipalities to pursue historic preservation objectives under
the zoning power.

See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 89.040 ( 1 9 71 ) ; NEB . REV. STAT.

§ 1 9-903 ( 1 970) .

And numerous preservation enabling acts contain provisions

expressly keyed into local zoning procedures.
3 1 : 89-b ( 1 970)

See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §

("All [historic] districts and [preservation] regulations shall be

established in relation to the comprehensive plan and the comprehensive zoning
§ 45-24.1-7 ( 1971 )

ordinance of the city, or town") ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.

(denials of building permits by the historic district commission appealable to
zoning board of appeals ) .
8 1 ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-101 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1 97 0) .
82 Id. § 2-30I.
83 Id. § 2-209, Note at 52.
84 Id. § 2-209, Note at 52.
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be detailed in the local preservation ordinance ; and its adminis
tration would be vested primarily in the municipal landmark
commission. The second alternative, on the other hand, would
emphasize the Plan's hybrid character by according an increased

role to the state zoning enabling act and to the local zoning
ordinance and planning commission.
The first of these routes was generally followed in Illinois.85

That state's preservation enabling act was amended in 1 9 7 1 to
empower municip alities to implement all features o f the Plan,
including establishment of a development rights bank, acquisition
of preservation restrictions and transfer of development rights.86

As a precautionary measure, the "purposes" section of the state
zoning enabling act was also revised to reflect that preservatio n

of historic buildings is a proper objective of zoning.87

Local

communities will implement the Plan through their preservation
ordinances,88 but must revise the definition of "zoning lot" in
their zoning ordinances to include the constructive lot area which
owners are authorized to transfer under the Plan as well as actual
lot area.89 The respective responsibilities of the landmark and
planning commissions assume the form outlined earlier in this
article.90
The second approach has been chosen in New York.

Pro

visions implementing the New York program appear in the city's
zoning ordinance,91 which assigns the dominant administrative
role to the planning commission. 92 Since no amendatory legisla
tion was sought at the state level, the city apparently concluded
that its state zoning enabling act already empowered it to adopt
these provisions.
Although either approach is workable, the Illinois r oute seems
preferable because it p ermits c o ordinated treatment in a single
statutory enactment of the property, condemnation, and land use
features of the Plan. In addition, it recognizes that zoning and

85 See

Ill. Pub. A. No. 77-1372 (Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 3 1 , 1971 ) , in part to be
u-48.2-1A, in part amending ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 24, § u-48.2-2 & -6 (1969 ) .
codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §
so

Id.

87

See Ill. Pub. A. No. 77-1373 (Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 3 1 , 1971 ) , amending ILL.
Rtv. STAT. ch. 24, § u-13-1 ( 1 969) . Other state zoning enabling acts containing

a similar provision are listed in note 80 su pra.
88
See Chicago Report app. III.
89 Id.
90

91

See pp. 591 -92, 595 supra.
See NEW YORK, N .Y., ZONING RESOLUTION , art. VII, ch. 4 ,

( 1971 ) .

92 See p. 585 supra.

§ 74-79 et se q.
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the regulation of individual landmarks are actually separable
manifestations of the police power.93
JIJ. LEGALITY OF THE TRANSFER PROPOSAL
Despite the economic feasibility and sound urban design fea
tures of the Chicago Plan, the prospect of a legal challenge may
deter its acceptance by landmark owners, the real estate industry,
and local government. A court test of the plan is likely to center
upon three o f its principal features : the condemnation of preser
vation restrictions, insofar as i t makes possible the sale of de
velopment rights ; the use of preservation restrictions to encumber
landmark properties ; and the authorization of greater floor area
for development rights purchasers than for other property owners
within the transfer district. Opponents o f the proposal will con
tend that it violates the "public use" limitation on governmental
93 The misconception that zoning and the regulation o f individual landmarks
are indistinguishable manifestations of the police power probably results from the
fac·t that early preservation ordinances focused almost exclusively on the regulation
of historic districts. Historic districting may properly be viewed as a special case
of zoning because of its area-wide focus. But a "zoning" measure that singles out
an individual landmark property for severe bulk, use, and area restrictions not
applicable to its neighbors generally would risk invalidation on spot zoning and
equal protection grounds. See also note 36 supra. Further, while zoning estab
lishes area-wide restrictions that may be varied only in cases of individual hard
ship, most preservation ordinances treat all formally designated landmarks as
potential candidates for variances. Formal designation does not and is not intended
to impose permanent landmark status on these properties. Rather, it continues un
der most ordinances only so long as the landmark owner consents or, under others,
until the owner establishes that designation entails undue economic burdens. See p.
5 8 1 supra. It is for this reason that courts typically reject due process attacks on
designation alone, but caution that designation and its attendant restrictions must
be lifted upon a proper showing of economic deprivation. See, e.g., Trustees of
Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2 d 933 , 2 80 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct.
1 96 7 ) , rev'd on other grounds, 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 2 88 N.Y.S .2d 314 (1968) ;
Manhattan Club v. Landmark Preservation Comm'n, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 2 73

N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1 9 6 6 ) ; cf. State ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 28
Ill. App. 2d 2 5 2 1 7 1 N.E.2d 246 ( 1 960) ; In re Opinion of the Justices, 33 Mass .
7 73 , 1 28 N.E. 2d 5 5 7 ( 1 955 ) .
If individual landmarks could be regulated through the zoning power, the
objectives of the Chicago Plan could be achieved largely by downzoning all land
mark sites to the bulk of their present improvements. Measures akin to this
technique were upheld in Rebman v . City of Springfield, I I I Ill. App. 2d 430, 250
N.E.2d 282 ( 1 969 ) (downzoning of commercial area around President Lincoln's
home to low density residential uses upheld) , and underlie the "limited heigh t
,

district" provision of the New York Zoning Resolution. See NEW YORK N.Y.,
ZONING RESOLUTION art. 1 , ch. I , § I l -1 2 1 ; art. 1 , ch. 2 , § 12-10 ( 1 9 7 1 ) (strict
height limits may be imposed throughout designated historic districts ) . Both
examples, however, entail regulation of entire areas of a city, not of individual
landmarks.
,
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power under the state and federal constitutions to condemn prop
erty because the acquisition of preservation restrictions is linked
to a scheme of selling development rights on the private market.
They will attack the use of preservation restrictions on various
grounds : the most troublesome is that such restrictions are not
recognized property interests and that their acquisition is not
authorized by existing preservation enabling acts and ordinances.
And they are likely to assert that nonuniform floor area alloca
tions violate state zoning enabling legislation and deny equal pro
tection and due process to property owners who do not purchase
development rights.
A. The Public Use Requirement
If the Chicago Plan envisaged only the condemnation of an in 
terest in landmark properties, no serious constitutional objection
based on the public use requirement could be asserted against the
Plan's employment of the condemnation power. The courts have
repeatedly held that landmark preservation is a public use, in
aid of which that power may be exercised.94 Moreover, the ob
jection that acquisition of less-than-fee interests fails to promote
a public use because such interests are not susceptible to physical
use or occupation by the public has also been discredited.95 It is
now recognized that visual enjoyment alone constitutes a sufficient
use by the public to warrant condemnation.
But the Chicago Plan also authorizes municipalities to resell
in the private market the development rights associated with the
preservation restriction that it condemns in private properties.
Because condemnation of the preservation restriction and re
sale of the associated development rights are connected steps in
an integral scheme, opponents of the Chicago Plan may assert
that it violates the public use requirement on two further grounds .
First, it may be argued that, despite its claimed public objectives ,
the Plan in fact serves the interests of a distinct private group,
namely development rights purchasers. Second, it may be argued
that governmental action taken to recoup the costs of condemna
tion of the preservation restriction violates the public use re
quirement.
Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191 (1 929) ; United States
( 1896 ) ; Barnidge v. United States, 101
F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Unfred States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 99 F. Supp.
71 4 (E.D. Pa. 195 1 ) , aff'd, 2 1 5 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1954) .
95 See, e.g., Kansas City v. Liebi, 2 9 8 Mo. 569, 2 5 2 S.W. 404 ( 1923) ; In re
New York, 5 7 App. Div. 166, 1 73 , 68 N.Y.S. 196, 200-01 , aff'd p er wriam, 1 6 7
94

See, e.g., Roe

v.

v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668

N.Y. 624, 60 N.E. uo8 ( 1 901 ) ; Kamrowski v . State, 3 1 Wis. 2 d 2 5 6 , 1 4 2 N.W.2d

793 (1966) .
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Private Benefit.

-

Without the active participation of pri

vate developers, the transfer proposal cannot succeed. To secure

their support, it accords them preferential treatment by relaxing
zoning restrictions to permit them to build more profitably than
nonparticipants in the program.

Hence, there is the possibility

of an attack on grounds that the proposal serves private rather
than public interests and that the use of eminent domain to this
end is invalid.

Similar charges are seen in cases dealing with

governmental efforts to enlist private enterprise in programs de
signed to renew urban areas,96 attract industry to depressed loca
tions,97 revitalize port and terminal facilities,98 and secure the

construction of parking facilities 99 and government buildings. 1 00
This charge is a difficult one for the courts to handle. The
dangers of improper private gain are often quite real.

And, re

grettably, favoritism or venality on the part of the public officials
who administer these programs is not uncommon.

But this cen

tury has witnessed a vast expansion of governmental responsibil
ities as a result of population growth and the population movement
to the cities. The courts have responded by broadening earlier no
tions of the ambit of the public use concept and by according legis
latures wide discretion in selecting means for meeting these re
sponsibilities.101

Moreover, the charge that a program, legisla

tively declared to be a public use, actually serves private interests
requires courts to go behind the statute to peer into legislative
motive and into the program's history and implementation. Few
courts welcome these tasks.
Judicial discomfort in the face of these difficulties pervades
the decisions that examine allegations of undue private gain.
Four conclusions emerge from an examination of such cases.
02
First, private gain, whether accruing to identified individuals 1
96

See, e.g., Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 3 5 7 Pa. 3 2 9 , 340, 54 A.2d 277,

282 ( 1 94 7 ) .
97 See, e.g., City o f Frostburg v. Jenkins, 2 1 5 Md. 9 , 16-1 7, 136 A.2d 852 ,.
856 ( 1 957) ; Basesore v. Hampden Indus. Dev. Auth., 433 Pa. 40, 50, 248 A.2d.
2 1 2 , 2 1 7 ( 1 968 ) .
98 See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Auth., 14 Ill .
2 d 2 3 0, 236, 1 5 1 N.E.2d 3 1 1 , 3 1 5 ( 1 958) .
99 See, e.g., Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 5 2 1 , 530, 94 N.E.2d 416, 421
( 1 950) ; Court St. Parking Co. v. Boston, 336 Mass. 2 2 4 , 230, 143 N.E.2d 683 ,
687 ( 1 957) .
100
See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, II Ill. 2d 125,
144 , 142 N.E.2d 6 7 , 7 7-78 ( 1 9 5 7 ) .
101
See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, I I Ill. 2d 125,
142 N.E.2d 67 ( 1 957) ; Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md. 438, 2 14 A.2d
76 1 ( 1 965) ; Court St. Parking Co. v. B oston, 336 Mass. 2 24, 143 N.E.2d 683
( 1 95 7 ) .
102
See, e.g., Hanston v. Danville & W . Ry., 208 U.S. 598 ( 1 908) ; Town of
Steilacoom v. Thompson, 69 Wash. 2d 705, 4 1 9 P.2d 989 (196 6 )
.

605

LANDMARKS PRESERVATION

or to the private sector g enerally,103 does not itself invalidate a
program. Second private gain must be justified by the benefits
accruing to the

�ublic under

the program.104

Judicial tests of

justification are crude and, in large measure, conclusory : some
courts reason that private g ain must be "incidental" or "subor
dinate" to the public gain; 105 others emphasize that the public
gain must justify the risk sustained by the government in the

program.106 Third, each case turns very much on its own facts
and the specific leg islative framework within which the program
operates.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, allegations of

undue private gain are rejected in the overwhelming majority of
cases ; they prevail only under circumstances of clearly dispro
portionate private g ain.107
These conclusions augur well for the transfer proposal. That
developers receive substantial benefits does not of itself taint the
proposal. Authoritative recog nition of landmark preservation as
public use is persuasive evidence that the public advantages
of the proposal offset those benefits.108 Moreover, the transfer
a

proposal contains safeguards to insure that the benefits to private
developers do not become the tail that wags the dog. Condemned
development rights are credited to the municipal bank in an
amount strictly calculated to reimburse the city for its condemna
tion costs. Besides, since developers will be expected to bid for
the development rights on the open market, the value of these
rights will be returned to the city in the form of cash payments
from these developers.
2.

Recoupment. - The second aspect of the public use limi

tation proscribes condemnation solely designed to recoup the cost
of public programs or to add to the public fisc generally.

It is

on this basis, for example, that courts have frowned upon excess
condemnation,109 the acquisition of more land than is needed for
103
104

See cases cited notes 96-100 supra.

See Note, State Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Domain,
77 HARV. L. REV. 7 1 7 , 724-25 (1964) ; Note, The 'Public Purpose' of Municipal
Financing for Industrial Development, 70 YALE L.J. 789, 796 ( 1 96 1 ) .
105
See, e.g., Papadinis v. City of S omerville, 3 3 1 Mass. 627, 6 3 2 , 1 2 1 N.E.2d
714, 717 ( 1 954) ; Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 458, 9 9
N.E.2d 235, 2 3 8 (195 1 ) .
106
See Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 422 Pa. 3 1 7, 336, 2 2 1 A.2d 1 3 8 ,
1 4 9 (1 966 ) .
107
See, e.g., Shizas v. Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589 ( 1 9 5 2 ) ; Denihan
Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 4 5 1 , 99 N.E.2d 235 ( 1 9 5 1 ) ; P rice v .
Philadelphia Parking Auth., 4 2 2 Pa. 3 1 7 , 2 2 1 A.2d 1 3 8 ( 1 966 ) ; Note, State Con
stitutional Limitations on Eminent Domain, supra note 104, at 7 2 4-25.
108
See cases cited note 94 supra.
109
See Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929) , af!'d, 281 U.S. 439
(1 930) ; cf. Salisbury Land & Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 3 7 1 ,
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a public project with the intent to resell the remainder at a profit
after completion of the project. Needless to say, the recoupment
objection has particular relevance to the transfer proposal : only
by selling development rights acquired from nonparticipating
landmark owners will a city be able to compensate them for their
losses.
The courts have been no more comfortable with the recoup
ment objection than with the claim of u ndue private benefit.
Again, the competing considerations are not easily reconciled.
The key objection to recoupment concerns the propriety of utiliz
ing eminent domain, one of the harshest o f governmental powers,
to fund public programs, rather than resorting to general tax
revenues for this purpose. Municipal poverty, it is argued, does
not justify such drastic interference with private ownership.110
For some, the objection is ideological : 11 1 government has no place
in the private real estate market and thus should not be able to
sell or lease portions o f condemned property to private parties.
For others, it rests on the practical consideration that government
enjoys unfair advantages over the private real estate industry in
any competition between the two. 1 12 Still others express misgiv
ings about the wisdom of government becoming involved in high
risk ventures. 1 13 The final objection is the familiar one that oppor
tunities for favoritism and corruption are heightened by public
programs that return large sums of money to municipalities.114
On the other hand, adherents o f recoupment counter that expand
ing governmental responsibilities in this century have created
demands for public funding that simply cannot be met out of
1 0 2 N.E. 6 19 (1913 ) . See generally R. CUSHMAN, ExcEss CONDEMNATION (1917)
[hereinafter cited as CUSHMAN ] ; Hodgman, Air Rights and Public Finance: P11blic
Use in a New Guise, 42 S . CAL. L . REV. 6 2 5 ( 1969) .
1 10
See, e.g., CUSHMAN 14-16.
111
See Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 563 , 74 S.E.2d 891 , 894 ( 1 953)
(to permit eminent domain for urban renewal would "cut the very foundation
from under the sacred right to own property") .
112

See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 485, 105

A . 2 d 6 1 4 , 640 (Sup. Ct. 1954)

( dissenting opinion) ; Adams v. Housing Auth., 60

So. 2 d 663 , 668-69 (Fla. 195 2 ) ; Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth., 12
N.Y. 2d 3 79, 398 , 190 N.E.2d 402 , 4n, 240 N.Y$.2d 1 , 13-14 (1963) (Van Voorhis,

J . , dissenting) .
1 13
See, e.g., Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2 d 663, 670 (Fla. 195 2) (char
acterizing urban renewal as a "gigantic real estate promotion") .

After detailing

the enormous losses of public monies suffered by European countries that utilized
excess condemnation schemes in the 1 9 th century, Cushman states that " [t]he first
conclusion is that the risk of loss is too serious to warrant
excess condemnation] as
1 14

a

method of municipal finance."

[the] adoption [of

CUSHMAN 212.

See, e.g., Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 5758, 88 A. 904 , 90 8 ( 1913 ) .

LANDMARK S PRESERVA TION

general tax revenues.1 1 5 Without recoupment of at least some o f
vital importance to
these funds ' they note, many programs o f 116
public welfare would be gravely endangered.
Caught between these opposing contentions, the courts have
found uneasy refuge in the formula that recoupment objections
will be overridden if the recoupment is but an ''incidental" ele
1
ment of a program that furthers an independent public use.1 7
This formula is first cousin to the judicial formula used to evaluate
claims of undue private gain, both formulas approving the chal
1
lenged feature if it rides piggyback on a recognized public use. 1 8
While both formulas are imprecise, they allow the judiciary to
control the more egregious of legislative excesses. And both for
mulas result in the approval o f the great majority of the programs
to which they are applied.
Three groups of cases serve to illustrate judicial reluctance
to invalidate the use of eminent domain because of a recoupment
objection. The first concerns the propriety of selling a byproduct
of property condemned for a public project, 119 best illustrated in
litigation dealing with the sale of electricity from navigation im
provement projects undertaken by federal and state agencies.
Recoupment challenges to such sales have been decisively re
jected.120 In rejecting such challenges, the courts have pointed
to three grounds for validating such sales : they enable public
agencies to recapture the costs of public improvements ; 1 2 1 they
m See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 46r, I05
A.2d 6r4, 627 (Sup. Ct. r954) ; cf. Haar & Hering, supra note 75 ; Hodgman,
supra note ro9.
1 16
See cases cited note IOI supra.
117
See, e.g., Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal, 142
U.S. 254, 2 73 ( 189 1 ) ; Wilmington P arking Auth. v . Ranken, 3 4 Del. Ch. 43 9 ,
450, 105 A.2d 614, 620-2r (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v .
Port Au th., 1 2 N.Y.2d 3 79, 390, 190 N.E.2d 402, 406, 240 N.Y . S . 2 d l , 7 ( 1 963 ) .
1 18
An examination of the opinions reveals that a court's willingness to label
the recoupment feature "incidental" to the underlying purpose frequently turns
upon i.ts willingness to concede that the latter is indeed a public purpose. Compare
In re Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 1 2 6 N.E.2d 795 ( 1 9 5 5 ) , and Hogue
v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 3 4 r P.2d l 7 I (r959) , with Lerch v. Mary
land Port Auth., 240 Md. 438, 214 A . 2 d 761 ( r 965 ) , and Atwood v. Willacy
County Navigation Dist., 2 71 S.W.2d 13 7 (Tex. 1954) , appeal dismissed, 3 5 0 U . S .
804 ( 1955 ) . Especially illustrative o f the mixing of t h e two issues is the dissenting
opinion of Judge Van Voorhis in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth.,
12 N.Y.2d 3 79, 393, 190 N.E.2d 402, 407, 240 N.Y.S .2 d I, 9 ( 1 9 63 ) .
119
See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 2 9 7 U.S. 288 ( r 936) ; Arizona v. California,
283 U.S. 423 (193 1 ) ; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water P ower Co., 2 2 9
U.S. 53 (r913 ) ; Kaukauna Water Power Co. v . Green Bay & Miss. C anal Co.,
142 U.S. 2 54 ( 1891 ) .
120
See cases cited note I I 9.
121
See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power C o . , 2 2 9 U.S. 53,
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advance community welfare by making possible the fulfillment
of vital public needs that would otherwise go unmet for lack of
funds ; 122 and they encourage the productive use of valuable re
sources .123
In the byproduct cases no portion of the condemned land is
devoted to private uses. The recoupment question is more difficult
in the second group of cases, which examine projects in which
space in buildings erected on condemned land is leased to private
firms to defray proj ect costs. Such arrangements are common in
highway, port, railroad terminal, governmental center, and park
ing projects.124 Again, however, the courts generally find that
recoupment of project costs through leasing arrangements with
private firms is "incidental" to an overall public use.125
Certain factors stand out i n the leasing cases which are rele
vant to the Chicago Plan.

I f the project cannot be carried on

without recoupment or i f it responds to a public need that private
enterprise cannot or will not meet, the courts are likely to be sym
pathetic.126 That the project involves government in competition
with private enterprise is irrelevant provided that an independent
public use is served b y the endeavor.127 Nor are the courts im72-73 ( 1 9 1 3 ) ; Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 142
U . S . 2 54, 2 73 ( 1 891 ) .
122
See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 2 9 7 U . S . 288, 336-3 7 ( 1 936) ; Kaukauna Water
Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 142 U .S . 2 54, 2 73 (189 1 ) .
123
Cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 2 9 7 U.S. 288 ( 1 936 ) ; Arizona v. California, 283
U.S. 423 ( 1 93 1 ) .
124
See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, I I III. 2d 125,
142 N.E.2d 6 7 ( 1 95 7 ) (public buildings) ; Lerch v . Maryland Port Auth. , 240
Md. 438, 2 1 4 A.2d 761 ( 1 96 5 ) (port facilities) ; Court St. Parking Co. v. Boston,
3 3 6 Mass. 2 2 4, 143 N.E.2d 683 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ( parking facilities) ; Bush Terminal Co. v.
New York, 282 N.Y. 306, 26 N.E . 2 d 269 ( 1 940) ( railroad terminal facilities) .
125
See, e .g., Wilmington Parking Au th. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch . 439, 105 A.2d
6 1 4 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (lease of space in municipal parking facility) ; People ex rel.
Adamowski v. Chicago R .R . Terminal Auth., 14 Ill. 2d 230, 1 5 1 N.E.2d 3 r r
( 1 9 5 8 ) (lease of space i n railroad ·terminal ) ; I n r e Opinion o f the Justices, 330
Mass. 7 1 3 , n3 N.E.2d 45 2 ( 1953 ) (lease of space for restaurants and filling sta
tions along highways) . But see Shizas v. Detroit, 3 3 3 Mich. 44, 5 2 N.W.2d 589
( 1 9 5 2 ) (lease of space in parking facility invalid) ; Price v. Philadelphia Parking
Auth., 4 2 2 Pa. 3 1 7 , 2 2 1 A . 2 d 138 ( 1 966 ) (same) .
126
See cases cited note 1 2 5 supra ; cf. In re Slum Clearance, 331 Mich. 714,
50 N.W.2d 340 ( 1 95 1 ) .
127
In his dissenting opinion in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth .,
12 N.Y.2d 3 79 , 39 3, 1 90 N.E.2d 402, 407, 240 N.Y.S.2d l, 9 ( 1 963 ) , Judge Van
Voorhis warned "that centralization of international trade firms in one govern
mentally sponsored center threatened to wreak havoc with New York City's
priva.te real estate market. However, private enterprise has no constitutionally
protec.ted immunity from competition by governmental agencies, see, e.g., Green
v . Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 243 ( 1 9 20) ; Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521,
5 2 9 , 94 N.E.2d 416, 420 ( 1 950) .
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pressed with claims that a program is not financially feasible ;
they defer to legislative judgment on questions of program con
tent and merit unless the program is patently u nreasonable.128
Similarly, they reject the oft-repeated charge that use of the emi
nent domain power in part for recoupment goals opens the way to
"outside land speculation" and other abuses.129

Should these

abuses eventuate, they note, an appropriate remedy will lie in
the courts.

Otherwise, government, too, is entitled to exercise

sound business judgment in the formulation and conduct of public
programs.130
In the final group of cases, which deal with the recoupment
objection in the context of urban renewal, the government's in 
volvement with the condemned property is the most attenuated.
In urban renewal programs, after the city has acquired and
cleared the land, it resells it to private developers. Once again,
however, the courts have overridden the recoupment objection .
Public use of the land, these courts say, is achieved once the city
has acquired and cleared i t.131
128

Its resale to private developers

See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 448-49,
105 A.2 d 614, 620 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md.
43 8, 449, 2 14 A.2d 76 1 , 767 (1965 ) .
129
See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, I I Ill. 2d 1 2 5 ,
144, 142 N.E.2d 67 ( 1 95 7 ) ; People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, 3 III. 2d 539,
545, 121 N.E.2d 791, 795 (1954) ; Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth., 1 2
N.Y.2d 3 79, 391, 190 N.E.2d 402, 406, 240 N . Y.S.2d 1 , 7 (1963 ) .
13 0 In United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 3 2 7 U.S. 546 (194 6 ) , the Supreme
Court upheld the condemnation of a strip of land not directly included within a
TVA project area against the claim that the TVA's sole motive in acquiring the
land was to reduce project costs. The Court reasoned:
The cost of public projects is a relevant element . . . . [T]he Government,
just as anyone else, is not required to proceed oblivious to elements of costs.
. . . And when serious problems are created by its public proj ects, the Gov
ernment is not barred from making a common sense adjustment in the
interests of all the public.
Id. at 554 (citations omitted) . Numerous cases, both before and since, have ex
pressly acknowledged that government may exercise its power of eminent domain
in accordance with sound business judgment provided, of course, that a valid public
use underlies the governmental program. See, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v.
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925 ) ; Simmonds v. United States, 199 F.2d 305,
306 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Boston v. Talbot, 206 Mass. 82, 90, 91 N.E. 1014, 1016
(1910) ; cf. Brown v. United States , 263 U.S. 78 ( 1 923 ) .
1 31 See, e.g., People ex rel. Tuohy v. Chicago, 394 Ill. 477, 485 , 68 N.E.2d 7 6 1 ,
766 (1946) ; Papadinis v . City of Somerville, 3 3 1 Mass. 6 2 7 , 63 2 , 1 2 1 N.E.2d 714,
717 (1954) ; Foeller v. Housing Auth ., 198 Ore. 205, 241, 256 P .2d 752 , 769 ( 1 953 ) .
It should be noted, however, tha·t a number o f jurisdictions find that the public
use requirement is satisfied whenever a government program serves a public pur
pose. See, e.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 -Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 ( 1 954) .
These jurisdictions, therefore, would not even need to focus on the city's temporary
occupancy of condemned land in considering the validity of an urban renewal
·program.
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thereafter is but an "incidental" aspect of the urban renewal
process, akin to, if not identical with, the general municipal prac

tice o f disposing o f city property no longer needed for public
purposes. Retention o f the land, they note, would be poor munic
ipal stewardship because resale enables the community to recap
ture much o f its initial outlay and to return the land to produc
tive use and to the tax rolls.132
Taken together, the three g roups of cases indicate that the
success of a recoupment challenge to the condemnation of preser
vation restrictions under the Chicago Plan is extremely unlikely,
even though condemnation is connected with a scheme o f selling
development rights to fund the costs of condemnation. Like by
product sales, the transfer o f development rights enables public
agencies to recapture the costs o f public improvements (the costs
o f preserving landmarks ) ; to fulfill community needs that would
go otherwise unmet

( l andmark preservation being impractical

without the sale of development rights) ; and to ensure the pro
ductive use o f valuable resources ( the unused but authorized
development rights of public and private landmarks otherwise
being lost upon permanent designation ) .
The leasing cases reinforce this conclusion.

They emphasize

the legal irrelevancy of the fact that the sale of development
rights may involve the city in competition with private enterprise
if developers elect to purchase these rights rather than to acquire
privately owned parcels in completing land assemblages.

The

leasing cases confirm that competition between government and
the private sector is not legally objectionable so long as govern
ment enters the private marketplace in furtherance of a program
that serves an independent public use. Questions concerning the
financial feasibility o f the Chicago Plan will also not be litigable
under these precedents. Finally, charges that the Chicago Plan
might involve a municipality in land speculation and other abuses
will receive scant attention since the leasing cases establish that
this question will be considered only if and at the time that such
abuses eventuate.
The urban renewal cases off er further proof that, in and of it
self, the recoupment feature o f the Chicago Plan does not con
stitute a basis for the Plan's invalidati on. Under the Plan the city
retains a continuing interest in the landmark property in the form
of a preservation restriction. Yet, in the urban renewal context,
many courts have rejected the recoupment objection under a
rationale that does not obligate the city to keep any interest what132

See, e.g., In re Slum Clearance, 3 3 1 Mich. 714, 7 2 2 , 50 N.W.2d 340, 344

(1951 ) .
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soever in the urban renewal tracts that it resells to private de
velopers.133
B. The Preservation Restriction
The purchase or condemnation of preservation restrictions
raises a host of legal problems that lack clear resolution in most
states. Their range is suggested in Pontiac Improvement Co. v.

Board of Commissioners,134 a 1933 Ohio case that puzzled over
a statute authorizing local governments to condemn the "fee or
any lesser interest" in real estate. In Pontiac, the Cleveland Park
Commission attempted to condemn the right to impose controls
respecting drainage, construction, planting, and the like over the
plaintiff's land, which adjoined a city park. The court invalidated
the taking in a rather confused opinion that appears to reflect
at least three concerns. One is the injustice to the plaintiff of tak
ing a less-than-fee interest in his land, thereby leaving him with
all of the responsibilities but few of the privileges of ownership.135
The second is the novelty of the interest in question and, by im
plication, the vagueness of the statutory mandate on which the
taking was premised. The court might have approved the taking
had the interest fit within one of the traditional less-than-fee in
terests recognized at common law or had the authority for its
acquisition been clearly spelled out in the statute.

Third, its

doubts on both counts led it to conclude that, whatever the
nature of the interest, the statute failed to define the rights and
obligations of the parties with sufficient clarity to be enforce
able.136
133

To be sure, all local governments sell urban renewal tracts subject to re

strictive covenants that ensure that the

urban redevelopment plan for the area

will be accomplished.

Cf. Project Planning ch. 2 , at 1 (RHA No. 72op, 1969 ) ,
in U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK

(1 971) . Some jurisdictions, in finding that urban renewal serves a public use,
v. Housing Au th., 198 Ore. 205, 2 5 6 P .2d
752 ( 1953 ) . A significant number of other jurisdictions, however, find that a

point to this factor. See, e.g., Foeller

public use is achieved merely by the city's ownership of the urban renewal prop
erty during the period of clearance. See, e.g., People ex rel. Tuohy v. Chicago,

3 94 Ill. 477, 485 , 68 N.E.2d 761 , 766 ( 1 946 ) .
1 34 104 Ohio St. 447, 1 3 5 N.E. 635 ( 1 9 2 2 ) . See also Albright v . Sussex County
Lake & Park Comm'n, 71 NJ.L. 303, 5 7 A. 398 (Ct. Err. & App. 1 904) (taking

under statute authorizing acquisition of "rights of fishing common to all in
fresh
water lakes" held invalid) .
1 �
3

Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 104 Ohio St. 447 , 456-5 7 ,
135 N.E. 6 3 5 , 63 7-38 ( 1 92 2 ) .
1 36 ld.
at 463-64, 1 3 5 N.E. at 640. A further ground for the court's invalidation
was its conclusion that the condemnation
did not promote a public use. Id. at
.

•

45 9, 135 N .E at 638. This conclusion seems clearly inapplicable to preservation
603 supra.
.

restrictions, see p.
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a preservation restriction but with what

would now be termed a "conservation" o r "scenic easement." 137
The relation between the two types o f interests, however, is suffi 
ciently close that the concerns expressed in

Pontiac

provide a

useful framework for an examination of the legal problems affect
ing the preservation restriction.

Acquisition in Fee. - Pontiac's

r.

concern that a less-than

fee taking by itself is unfair to the landowner seems misplaced.
It runs counter to the well-settled view that public authorities
neither may nor should take a greater interest in or amount of
land than the public use necessitates.138

This view finds strong

support in the policies that favor limiting outlays o f public funds
and minimizing governmental interference with private owner
ship.139

Pontiac's

landmarks.

concern seems especially inapplicable to urban

Most o f

these buildings return amounts well in

excess of their taxes and operating expenses.
condemnation of a preservation restriction

Thus, even after

(with its concomi

tant tax reduction) , the landmark should be able to operate at a
profit.
However, in some cases landmarks will be unable to return
a profit after condemnation o f a preservation restriction.

In

these cases, leaving a landmark owner with what one commenta
tor calls the "rump rights"

140

o f ownership may raise questions

o f equity to the landmark owner.

Structural unsoundness, ad

vanced deterioration , o r changes in the surrounding neighborhood
may mean that acquisition o f a preservation restriction will, in
effect, saddle the owner with a white elephant. In such instances,
the landmark commission should recommend that the city ac
quire the property in fee.
2.

A cquisition of a Less-Than-Fee Interest. - The

powers of

purchase and eminent domain granted in many preservation acts
137

The literature concerning this interest has been extensive in recent years.

See, e.g., B RENNEMAN ; S. SIEGEL, THE LAW OF OPEN SPACE ( 1 960) ; A. STRONG,
OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA ( 1 965 ) ; w. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR
URBAN

AMERICA :

CONSERVATION

EASEMENTS

(Urban Land Institute, Technical

Bull. No. 3 6 , 1 959) ; N. WILLIAMS, LAND ACQUISITION FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION
- ANALYSIS OF SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS

view Comm'n

Study Report No.

16,

1962)

(Outdoor Recreation Resources Re
[hereinafter cited

as WILLIAMS] ;

Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1622

(196 2) ;

Note, Preservation of Open Spaces Through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt Zon

ing, 1 2 STAN. L. REV. 63 8 ( 1960) .
1 38
See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park,

2 78

Ill. 400, 406, 116

N.E. 1 78, 181 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ; 3 NICHOLS § 9 . 2 (3d rev. ed. 1 965) ; WILLIAMS 46.
139
3 NICHOLS § 9.2 (3d rev. ed. 196 5 ) .
1 40
WILLIAMS 48. I n Professor Williams' view, a "policy of taking conservation

easements under the characteristic general statute is undesirable, potentially un
fair, and legally dangerous." Id.
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are as imprecisely defined as those i n the Pontiac statute.141
Do these acts authorize the acquisition of a preservation restric
tion in landmark properties ?

As suggested above, that question

can be answered affirmatively only if a court is prepared to con
clude either that preservation restrictions fall within one of the
less-than-fee interests recognized at common law or that the stat
utory language itself creates a novel property interest.

(a) Traditional Interests.

- The first alternative assumes an

extremely sympathetic court.

Preservation restrictions do not

easily assume the garb of easements , real covenants, or equitable
servitudes, the relevant common law categories.142 They are most
often compared with negative easements,143 which obligate a land
owner to refrain from performing acts on his property that would
otherwise be permitted as an incident of fee ownership. Landmark
owners, for example, may not build in the airspace over their
buildings nor may they demolish or significantly alter them. But
negative easements have normally been restricted to the four
types approved in the early English cases : easements for light,
for air, for support of a building laterally or subjacently, and for
the flow of an artificial stream.144 Although resembling easements
for light and air in its restriction against building above the land
mark, a preservation restriction goes beyond the former in its
controls over alteration and demolition.145

In addition, some

courts may not enforce negative easements that are not "appur
tenant" to the benefited parcel, the dominant estate.146 The ap
purtenancy requirement is satisfied only if the easement benefits
the owner of that estate in the physical use and enjoyment of the
1 1
4

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 266 .06 ( 1962 ) ("real property o r rights or ease

ments therein") ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9004 ( 1 ) (Supp. 1 9 7 1 ) ("any real estate" ) .
1 42
The discussion of this extremely complex topic is necessarily abbreviated in
this paper. More detailed analyses may be found in BRENNEMAN 20-64 ; WILLIAMS
3 7-55 ; Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

Metropolitan Area Planning

Council,

Massachusetts Open Space Law: Government's Influence Over Land Use Decisions,
4 Open Space and Recreation Program for Metropolitan Boston, April 1969, at

18-23, 140-56 .
143
See, e.g., WHYTE, supra note 1 3 7 , a t 44-46 ; Comment, Legal Met hods of

Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. R EV. 6 u , 62 I ( 1 970) .

The easement cate

gory appears to be the one most readily invoked by courts when confronted with
a novel less-than-fee interest. See, e.g., Buck v. City of Winona, 2 7 1 Minn. 1 4 5 ,
151, 1 3 5 N.W.2d r90, 194 ( 1 965) ; Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586 , 596, 194 N . W .
159, 163 ( 1923 ) .
144

See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § § 8.5, 9 . 1 2 , 9.24 (A.J. C asner ed. 1952)

[hereinafter cited

as

AMERICAN LAW O F PROPERTY] ; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§§ 45o(e) , 452 ( 1 944) . But see
145

BRENNEMAN 23-2 4 ; WILLIAMS 49-50 & nn. 72-76.

See pp. 618-19 infra.
1 4s s
ee 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8 . 2 . But

see

WILLIAMS 5 1 .
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land and was created expressly for the purpose of conferring
that benefit.147 If these requirements are not met, the easement
will be deemed to be held "in gross." Municipal ownership of
parcels that will qualify as " appurtenant" is likely to be infre
quent unless the courts will so categorize city-owned properties
within the general vicinity o f a landmark or the publicly owned
streets and alleys that border on it.148

Even assuming that

a

jurisdiction approves negative easements in gross, moreover, the
assignability o f these interests has been questioned.149
It is even less likely that preservation restrictions will be
enforceable as real covenants.

Courts generally insist that these

interests, too, must b e appurtenant to a benefited dominant es
tate.150 An additional requirement, privity o f estate between the
original promisor and promisee, dictates that the benefited and
burdened parcels must initially have been in common ownership
and that the burden must have been imposed on the latter parcel
at the time the ownership was divided. Otherwise, the burden of
the real covenant will not bind subsequent takers of the parcel.151
Because few, if any, cases under the transfer proposal are likely
to duplicate these rather specialized facts, it is doubtful whether
a municipality will be able to enforce a preservation restriction
against a successor o f the owner who executed it.

In addition,

some jurisdictions balk at the enforcement of affirmative duties
in real covenants ,152 a qualification that could prove troublesome
i f a municipality wished to include maintenance obligations in
the preservation restriction.153
Characterizing

a

preservation

restriction as an equitable

servitude offers a m o re promising route than either o f the pre1
1

47

8
4

149

See 2 AMERICAN LAw

oF

PROPERTY

§§ 8.6, 9 . 8 .

See WILLIAMS 50.
For accounts of the confused state of the law on this problem, see, e.g. ,

BRENNEMAN 3 0 ; C. CLARK , REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH RUN
WITH LAND 6 7-79 ( 2 d ed. 1 94 7 ) ; Comment, Assignability of Easements in Gross,
3 2 YALE L.J. 813 ( 1 9 23 ) .
150

See, e.g., Young v. Cramer, 38 Cal. App. 2d 64,

loo

P .2d 523 ( 1 940) ; Lon

don County C ouncil v. Allen, [ 1 914] 3 K.B. 64 2 . But see Neponsit Property Own
ers' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 2 7 8 N.Y. 248, 1 5 N.E.2d 793 ( 1938) . The
British National Trust, which typically acquires real covenants in historic prop
erties , has secured legislation that eliminates the common law requirement that
it own nearby land as a condition to its right to e nforce the benefit of the cov
enants. See National Trust Act,
151

54.

l

Edw. 8 &

l

Geo. 6 ,

c.

lvii,

§ 8 ( 1 93 7 ) .

See, e.g., Hall v. Risley, 188 Ore. 69, 2 1 3 P . 2 d 818 ( 1 950) ; BRENNEMAN

But see Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d

83 2 , 196 N.Y.S.2d 945 ( 1 95 9 ) ; CLARK, supra note 149, at u6-2 1 .
152

See, e.g., Miller v. Clary, 2 1 0 N.Y. 1 2 7 , 1 03 N.E. l I I4 ( 1 9 13 ) ; BRENNEMAN

57 ; Lloyd , Enforcement of Affirmative Agreements Respecting the Use of Land,.
14 VA. L. REV. 419 ( 1 9 28) .
5
1 3

See pp. 618-19 infra.
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vious alternatives. Equitable servitudes are not res tricted t o four
specific types as are negative easements, but may i ncorporate any
obligation that does not violate public policy.154

No privity of

estate other than that provided by the agreement need exist be
tween the landmark owner who executes it and the city in order
for the agreement to be effective against successors of the for
mer.155

Servitudes are enforceable by injunction 156 and may

include affirmative as well as negative obligations .157 They must
reflect the intent to bind subsequent takers ; 158 and the latter
must have notice of the agreement,159 requirements easily satis
fied by careful draftmanship and use o f the deeds registry, re
spectively.

But in many jurisdictions servitudes held in gross

are not enforceable against subsequent takers o f the burdened
1 0
parcel 6 and may not be assignable as well.161 So again, munic
ipalities in these jurisdictions must be prepared to argue that
municipally owned property, whether adjacent to or nearby the
landmark property, will be directly benefited by en forcement of
the servitude.
The technicalities attending each of the common law interests
confuse the status of the preservation restriction under the com 
mon law. Though the courts in some jurisdictions m ay be willing
to enforce the preservation restriction under the rubric of one
of the foregoing interests, a pre ferable solution would seem to
lie in clarifying legislation.

( b ) Statutory A uthorization.

-

Whether statutory authoriza

tion to acquire an imprecisely defined, less-than-fee interest re
lieves a municipality of

the

burdensome

common law rules is problematic.

Pontiac

restrictions

suggests not.

opposite view, which may well have supplanted

Pontiac

of

the

But an
in most

jurisdictions,162 was tersely stated by then Chief Judge Holmes in

Newton v. Perry :
154

BRENNEMAN 50-5 1 , 5 5 .

155

See, e.g., Trustees of Columbia College v . Lynch, 7 0 N.Y. 440 ( 1 8 7 7 ) ; 2

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
156

BRENNEMAN 55.

§ 9.26 ;

BRENNEMAN 5 6 .

Real covenants, o n the other hand, may only b e enforced

in an action at law for damages. Id.
157

158
159

See BRENNEMAN 57 ; Lloyd, supra note 1 5 2 .
See Mass. Open Space Law, supra note 1 4 2 , at 148-49.

ld. at 148.
lso see
2 AMERlCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9 .3 2 ; BRENNEMAN 5 8 . But see Van
Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill . 401, 103 N.E. 1 94 ( 19 1 3 ) ; Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430,
n3 A.2d 492 ( 1955 ) .
161

162

See BRENNEMAN 59.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Ervin v. J acksonville Expressway Auth., 1 3 9 S o . 2d

135, 138 (Fla. 196 2 ) ; Cornwell v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 249 S.W.2d 53 1 ,
533 (Ky. Ct. App. 1 95 2 ) .
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. that the purpose of the taking must fix the

extent of the right. The right, whether i t be called easement or
by any other name, i s statutory, and must be construed to be
large enough to accomplish all that it has taken to do.163

The question is further confused by decisions that subsume
less-than-fee interests under one o f the traditional categories even
though they clearly fail to meet the formal requirements of the
latter.164
State legislatures have grown uneasy with the dubious formal
ism of the common law and the ambiguity in the case reports.
To facilitate highway beautification and open-space programs,
many have expressly authorized state and local agencies to ac
quire "scenic easements," "development rights," and other novel
less-than-fee interests.165 Although the statutes fail to detail pre
cisely what is intended by these labels, Kamrowski

v.

State,166

which upheld a Wisconsin statute authorizing acquisition of
"scenic easements" along the Great River Road, confirms the
readiness o f the judiciary to construe them most favorably to
the public agency . Significantly, Kamrowski did not even men
tion the possible difficulties posed by the differences between the
statutory easement and its common law cousin, but focused in
stead upon the compatibility o f the statute with the public use
requirement.
1 63

163 Mass. 319, 3 2 1 , 39 N.E. 103 2 , 1032 (1 B95 ) .
See, e.g., cases cited note 143 supra ; Bu rger v . .St. Paul, 241 Minn. 285,
64 N.W. 2 d 73 ( 1 954) . Burger is of special interest to this article because it
construes a statute that parallels the transfer proposal in enabling municipalities
16 4

to zone by acquiring the development potential of parcels within "designated
residential districts" in order t o prevent them from being utilized for other than
low-density, residential uses. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 462 .12-.14 ( 1 963 ) . In
Burger, 'the court variously labeled the interest that the statute empowered com
munities to condemn an "easement ,'' a "negative easement,'' a "reciprocal negative
easement,'' a "restrictive covenant,'' and, for good measure, a "negative equitable
easement." Burger v. St. Paul, supra at 293, 294, 297, 299, 64 N.W.2d at 78,
79, Bo, B r . It did no·t discuss whether the common law formalities applicable
to easements and real covenants were superseded by the statute notwithstanding
the obvious differences between the interest acquired and the common law interests.
Other cases construing the statute include State ex rel. M adsen v. Houghton, 182
Minn. 77, 233 N.W. 83 1 ( 1 930) ; Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 4531 209
N.W. 3 23 ( 1 9 2 6 ) ; State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144
Minn. 1 , 176 N.W. 159 (1920) . Approving a similar zoning scheme, the Missouri
Supreme Court labeled the interest acquired a "negative restriction." Kansas City
v. Kindle, 446 S .W.2d 807, 813-14 (Mo. 1969 ) . That court, too, ignored the com
mon law problems associated with its characterization o f the interest.
16 5 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CooE § § 6950--5 4 (West 1 966) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 9 2 , § 79 ( 1 969) ; WIS. S TAT. A NN . § 2 3 .30 (Supp. 1 9 7 1 ) .
1 66
3 1 Wis. 2 d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 ( 1 966) .
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Of greater interest are statutes in three states 167 that accord
express recognition to the preservation restrictions as an inde
pendent, valid less-than-fee

interest.

Directly addressing the

difficulties outlined in this s ection, these statutes provide that
preservation restrictions shall not be unenforceable because of
lack of privity of estate or of ownership of benefited land. They
also stress the assignability of preservation restrictions, even i f
168
held "in gross." Less elaborate statutes have also been passed
that modify the common law by recognizing "easements in gross,"
which are assignable and, if negative, not restricted to the four
types known to the common law.

By clarifying an intolerably

opaque area of the law, both groups of statutes enable govern
ment and the private sector to participate in preservation and
conservation programs confident that some hoary doctrine will
not frustrate their reasonable expectations.
3.

Indefiniteness. - The Pontiac

court considered that the

rights acquired by the park department were so i ndefinite as to
be incapable either of valuatio n or of enforcement. The valuation
ob j ection does not seem well taken.

Less-than-fee interests are

condemned as a matter of course by government and public util
ities. In these cases, a basic "before and after" theory of valua
tion is used that measures the value of the parcel with and without
the encumbrance.169 And, although "not simple," s etting a price
tag for preservation restrictions "by no means goes beyond tech
niques which are widely recognized in the field o f real estate

valuation. "

170

Nor is the court's skepticism concerning enforcement insuper
able if the preservation restriction is properly drafted. In fact,
167

See CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. P .A . No. 1 73 ,

§ 2 [Jan. 1 9 7 1 ] Conn. Legis.
§ n-24.2-1 A ( 2 ) ( 1 9 7 1 ) ;

Service No. 2 ('May 16, 1 9 7 1 ) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 84, § 32 ( Supp. 1 9 70) .

In addition to curing the ambiguities of the common law in relation to preserva
tion restrictions, the Massachusetts statute also provides for the recordation o f
these interests o n a public tract index and suspends the operation of Massachusetts'
marketable title and obsolete-restrictions legislation for any interest entered upon
the index. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184,
168

See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 2 1 ,

(Supp. 1971 ) .
169

.
.
For appraISal tec hmques

used

§§ 3, 33 (Supp. 1 9 70 ) .
§ 8 (1957 ) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 2 r .1 2

with respect to the acquisitio n of less-than·

fee interests generally, see, e.g., 4 NICHOLS § 1 2 .4 (3d
rev. ed. 1 9 7 1 ) ; South v.
Texas E. Transmission Co., 332 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1 960) . A useful
analysis of the valuation techniques used in
the acquisition of scenic easements
along highways is found in DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION OF WISCONSIN A
MARKET STUDY OF PROPERTIES COVERED BY ScENIC
EASEMENTS ALONG THE GR AT
RIVER ROAD IN VERNON AND PIERCE C ouN
TIEs
( Special Report No. 5, 1 96 7 ) .
.
Valuation of preservation restrictions
is discussed in Chicago Report u - 1 5
17° Chicago Report n .

�

.

·
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with the increasing refinement o f these instruments, indefiniteness
no longer appears to be a serious problem.

Typical preservation

restrictions 171 detail the legal authority o n which acquisition is
premised, restrictions on use, m aintenance obligations, duration,
remedies, and miscellaneous matters.

Public agencies and pres

ervation societies carefully spell out the statutory basis for ac
quisition to emphasize that they are empowered to acquire the
interest and that enforcement of the latter is consistent with

sound public policy.

Use restrictions are a s varied as the char

acter and setting of particular landmarks.

They may include

prohibitions against alteration or demolition, signs, subdivision
o f the landmark tract, addition of buildings to the site and speci

fied uses of the landmark.

Administrative provisions detail the

procedures for obtaining approval for permitted modifications
and for making periodic inspections of the premises to insure
that the restrictions are being honored. M aintenance obligations
are variously stated.

Landmark owners may agree simply to

keep their properties in good repair or they may undertake to
comply with property maintenance standards that are incorpo
rated by reference into the preservation restriction.

In some in

stances, owners even commit themselves to restore the properties
in accordance with detailed specifications and schedules.
Duration of the restriction may be in perpetuity or be limited
to a number o f years. The instruments underscore the intent of
the parties that the benefits and burdens of the restriction shall
run to their successors in interest. The remedies clause identifies
who may sue for breach of the restriction and what relief may
be obtained. Miscellaneous provisions may include anything from
rights o f first refusal to express disclaimers of rights of public
access to the landmark. Surveys, line drawings, and photographs
appear increasingly as appendices to preservation restrictions.
They permit precise identification of prized interior or exterior
features, such as paneling, fireplaces, and cornices.
Although most preservation restrictions relate to residential
properties a t the present time, they can b e drawn just as effec
tively for d owntown office and commercial buildings .

Remedies

and legislative authority clauses will be similar in the two cases.
Use restrictions should prove simpler for downtown buildings
171

Instruments reviewed in compiling the outline in the text are those ac

tually being used by the following organizations and institutions : Maryland His
toric Trust ;
(Mass.)

Historic Annapolis,

Historic Trust ;

Inc. ;

Cambridge

States Dept. of the Interior.

Historic Savannah

(Mass.)

Historic

Foundation ; Ipswich

Trust ;

and

the United

Useful guidelines and examples for use in drafting

conservation and, derivatively, preservation restrictions may be found in BRENNE

MAN apps. II, IV ; WHYTE, supra note 137, at

44-46,

apps. A-H passim ; Wn.UAMS

53-5 5 ; Mass. Open Space Law, supra note 142 , at app. 8 .
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because tract subdivision and the addition of new buildings are
not serious problems. Continuation of office or commercial uses
within these buildings, moreover, will not impair their status as
landmarks. Controls over alteration will deal mostly with changes
in the exterior facades of these buildings, an infrequent occur
rence and one that is relatively easy to regulate.
The definition of proper m aintenance standards is no different
for downtown landmarks than for other centrally located office
and commercial buildings. It is a routine responsibility for attor
neys who represent the holders of mortgages on the latter struc
tures and the tenants who occupy space in them under long-term
leases. The task will be somewhat complicated, however, if the
landmark commission's appraisal of a building reveals that res
toration of the building or one or more of its characteristic fea
tures is in order. In those instances, the financial package that
the commission proposes to the landmark owner may include
sums for this work. If so, the nature of the restoration and any
specific requirements regarding subsequent maintenance must be
detailed in the restriction or in a related document, as the sense
of the transaction dictates.
The most troublesome drafting problem is posed by the fact
that many downtown office and commercial buildings have a
limited economic life. The day may come, sooner for some land
marks than for others, when they can no longer meet debt service
and operating costs as a result of increases in the latter and
declining revenues.

At that point, ownership for private profit

obviously becomes impossible.

Among the potential solutions to this problem, three seem
especially promising.172 One is to project the costs and income
curves of individual landmarks to arrive at a date in the future
when those curves are likely to intersect. The owner of the land
mark could be given the option at that date either of continuing
to operate the building or of turning it over to the city. Acquisi
tion costs then would be nominal because of the landmark site's
lack of development potential and the further age of the building.
The city could use the buildin g for its own space needs or lease
it to a suitable tenant who desires the prestige of a landmark
location. 1 73 The second is to devise appropriate subsidies for
172

The Department of Housing and Urban Development has awarded a demon

stration grant to the National Trust for Historic Preservation to examine the
general applicability of the transfer p r oposal in the United States.

A major con

cern of this broader study, which is being directed by the author of this article,

is the problem of duration discussed in the text.
173

Numerou s illustrations of this possibility are recounted in Dollars and Sense :

Preservation Economics, HIST. PRESERVATION, Apr.-June 1 9 7 1 , at

15.

Se e also N.Y.

Times, Aug. 12, 19 71 at 1 , col. 1 , for an account o f the plans to rent the Villard
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landmark owners out of monies generated by the development
rights bank. The third is to seek an institutional buyer, such as a
college or other nonprofit organization, to acquire the building
after its development rights have been transferred. Developers
and speculators will probably not wish to retain the building after
that point, and the buyer will be in a position to acquire it at a
favorable price.
C.

Development Rights Transfers

The Chicago Plan contemplates a two-level system of bulk
zoning regulation - development rights purchasers are permitted
to build larger structures than the other lot owners in a develop
ment rights transfer district. The legal issues inherent in this
disparate treatment will be addressed in this section, examining,
first, challenges based on the uniformity provisions of state
zoning acts and the equal protection clauses of the federal and
applicable state constitutions, and, second, objections grounded
in issues o f substantive due process .
1. "Uniformity" as a Statutory and Constitutional Restraint.
- The question whether application of a dual standard of bulk
regulation to lots within a transfer district denies uniform treat
ment to property owners within the district may be posed in
either statutory or constitutional terms. The relevant statutory
text is the requirement of most state zoning enabling acts that
" [ a ] ll [ zoning] regulations shall be uniform for each class or
kind of buildings throughout each district." 174 The governing
constitutional principle is the equal protection requirement of
the federal 175 and applicable state constitutions.
As seen above,176 the Chicago Plan could be implemented ex
clusively through a preservation enabling act. There are, how
ever, compelling reasons for analyzing the legal issues inherent in
the Plan's two-level system of bulk regulation through examining
judicial interpretations of the uniformity requirement of state
zoning enabling acts. In the first place, it is doubtful whether the
preservation enabling legislation of any state,177 Illinois excepted,
Houses, designated New York landmarks, to a "conservative commercial firm that
will use and maintain them in a style befitting a landmark."

174 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZONING, D EP T OF COMMERCE A STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING
REGULATIONS § 2 (rev. ed. 1 9 2 6 ) .
175 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § r .
'

,

1 7 6 See p. 601 supra.

177 While not expressly authorizing municipalities to engage in such programs,

the following state preservation enabling acts contain grants of power that may
be of sufficient breadth to warrant such a construction.

CAL.

Gov'T CODE §

3 73 6 1

(West 1968) ; N . M . STAT. ANN. § 14-2 1-4 ( 1968) . A less affirmative but po5.5ibly
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authorizes the use of transfers as a means of safeguarding land
marks. Thus communities that wish to avoid the problem of
securing amendments to that legislation must look to their zoning
enabling acts as the basis for their power to authorize develop
ment rights transfers. Second, zoning precedents offer the most
useful basis for predicting the likely judicial reaction to the trans
fer technique even if it is implemented under preservation en
abling statutes. If transfers pass muster under zoning precedents,
they would undoubtedly be v alid under a properly drafted pres
ervation statute as well. Finally, commentators are in general
agreement that the statutory requirement of uniformity dupli
cates the constitutional requirement of equal protection.17 8
Hence, if the transfers of development rights do not run afoul of
the uniformity requirement, it would appear that these transfers
would survive the equal protection challenge as well.
At first blush, the uniformity requirement seems to present an
obstacle to the legality of the Chicago Plan : regulations for build
ings within a dev elopment rights transfer district are not uniform
in the sense that purchasers of development rights can build to
greater bulk than other property owners within the district. This
reading of the uniformity requirement, however, ignores the
growing recognition of urban planners and municipal govern
ments that in many cases the individual lot is not the appropriate
unit of development control, and the corresponding willingness
of the courts to interpret the uniformity requirement so as not
to foreclose alternativ e planning methods.179
useful basis for implementing the proposal might be found in the l anguage of many
state preservation enabling acts authorizing local preservation commissions to de
vise an "economically feasible plan" to safeguard threatened landmarks in private
ownership.

See, e.g., Mo. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 8.09 (Interim Supp. 1 9 70) ;

MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 399.205 (4)
1 8
7

(Supp. 197 1 ) .

The chief draftsman of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act has written

that the purpose of the uniformity requirement is "to make it understood that
all property situated alike shall be treated alike."

E. BASSETT, ZONING 50 ( 1 940) .

See, e.g., Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV . L. REv .
r r 54, n 7 2

(1 955 ) .

Significantly, the uniformity provision has most frequently

been invoked in the spot-zoning context - where a small tract is zoned differently
from its surrounding area.

See, e.g., B artram v. Zoning Comm'n, 136 Conn. 8 9 ,

6 8 A.2d 3 0 8 (1949) ; Cassel v. Mayor & City Council, 1 9 5 Md. 348, 7 3 A . 2 d 486
(1950) .

Spot zoning, however, raises the statutory issue of conformity with a

"comprehensive plan" and the constitutional issue of equal protection. See Haar,

supra. It does not put in issue the statutory requirement of uniformity, which,
by the terms of the zoning enabling act, relates only to the manner in which
regulations are applied within the same zoning district.
179

At least four factors account for the current disrepute , among land use

scholars and local governments, of the premise that the individual lot should
serve

as the unit of development control. First, it hampers sound planning on a
communi ty-wide basis and promotes sterile design on individual sites. Second, it
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Virtually every major innovation in the land use field over
the last fifteen years rejects the notion that individual lots must
serve as the unit of development control.180 Two of these innova
tions - density zoning and the special development district are of particular relevance to the question whether development
transfers conflict with the uniformity requirement : they provide
the twin pillars upon which the development rights transfer ele
ment of the Chicago Plan is founded.

Rejecting the individual

lot as the unit of bulk control, density zoning 181 substitutes entire
areas of the community in its place.

It prescribes a maximum

amount o r range of bulk for an area as a whole, and permits
developers to concentrate bulk there in accordance with flexible
site planning or urban design criteria.

Typically, density zones

are overlay districts that include one or more traditional bulk
zones within their boundaries.

Developers may elect to build

under the bulk regulations of the density zone or under those of
the residual bulk zone.
The special

development

district 182

complements

density

zoning by particularizing the development goals that will guide
the distribution or redistribution of bulk within a density zone.
A special development district is established only after a munici
pality has evaluated the special functions or needs of the geograph
ic area in question, and selected the goals that will channel devel
opment or redevelopment there.

In most cases, these goals are

assumes that development still occurs on a lot-by-lot basis rather than on large
landholdings, as in urban renewal areas and on the metropolitan fringe.

Third,

it fails to take account of the special needs and functions of a community's unique
areas and to protect these areas from the destructive impact of private market
decisions.

Finally, it prevents communities from enhancing their

amenity levels

generally by means of incentive zoning programs such as those described in this
article.

See, e.g., E . LOVELACE &

W.

WEISMANTEL,

DENSITY

ZONING:

ORGANIC

ZONING: ORGANIC ZONING FOR PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVEWPMENT (Urban Land

Institute, Technical Bull. No. 4 2 , 1 9 6 1 ) ; NEw ZONING passim ; Goldston & Scheuer,
Zoning of Planned Residential Developments,

73

HA RV. L.

Symposium, Planned Unit Development, 1 1 4 U. PA. L. REV.
180

REV.
l

24I

(1959) ;

( 1 965 ) .

Among these developments are expanded use of the variance and special

exception, and innovations such as floating zones, cluster zones, planned unit de
velopments, overlay districts, and special development districts.

Accounts of the

evolution of 'these techniques may be found in authorities cited note 1 7 9 supra.
181

See authorities cited note

182

For discussions of special development districts see, e.g., Fonoroff, Special

l

79 supra.

Districts: A Departure from the Concept of Uniform Controls, in NEW ZONING
82 ; Huxtable, A Solid Dross City?, N.Y. Times, Mar. I4, 1 9 7 1 , § 2 , at 1 6 , col. 5 ;
Huxtable, supra note 13.

Examples of special development districts include the

New York Special Theater District, see note

ro

supra ; Fifth Avenue Retail Dis

trict, see note 12 supra ; and the Special Greenwich Street Development District,
see note 13 supra.

1972]
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incorporated into a detailed area plan that itself is coordinated
with the community's comprehensive plan.
A development rights transfer district is, in effect, a special
development district in which bulk is redistributed in accordance
with the density zoning technique. It encompasses an area of the
community that is unique because of the concentr ation there of
many of the community's landmark buildings. The community's
goal in establishing the transfer district, of course, is to safeguard
the landmarks within the district from destruction.

The detailed

plan that the landmark and planning commissions draw up for
the district is the product of exhaustive studies by both agencies
that inventory the landmark b uildings there, identify the bound
aries within which transfers may be made, and coordinate bulk
concentrations within the district with the community's overall
development program. Bulk is allocated within the transfer dis
trict on an area-wide rather than lot-by-lot basis because land
mark lots must remain underimproved while lots utilizing the
transferred development rights must be allowed to exceed the
bulk limitations that are p r escribed for individu al lots in the
traditional bulk zones within the district. The regulations o f the
residual bulk zone are superseded when the local governing
body approves development rights transfer authorizations recom
mended by the landmark commission.
Judicial reaction to challenges to density zoning measures
under the uniformity requirement augur well for the Chicago
Plan : no density zoning measure that has come before the courts
to date has been invalidated on the ground that it denies uniform
treatment to affected property owners.183
183

See, e.g., Orinda Homeowners

Challenges to these

Comm. v. Board of Supervisors,

II

Cal.

App.

3d 768, 90 Ca!.. Rptr. 88 ( 1970) ; Chrinko v. South Brunswick Tp. Planning
Bd., 77 N.J . Super., 594, 1 8 7 A.2d 2 2 1 (L. Div. 1 963 ) ; Cheney v. Village 2 at
New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A . 2 d 81 (1968) ; cf. Millbrae Ass'n for Residen
tial Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262 Cal. App. 2d 2 2 2 , 242-43 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 2 5 1 ,
265-66 ( 1 968) (dictum) .
The rock on which some density zoning ordinances have foundered has not

been the uniformity objection but the challenge of improper delegation of legis
lative power. See, e.g., Millbrae Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae,
supra ; Hiscox v. Levine,

3 1 Misc. 2d 1 5 1 , 2 1 6 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1 96 1 ) . See

generally Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development : A Challenge to Established
Legal Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, n4 U. PA. L. REV.

47 ( 1 96 5) ;
1 963

Mandelker, Delegatiot.i of Power and Function in Zoning Administration,

WASH. L.Q. 60 (1963 ) .

Although the decisions are hardly consistent, compare

Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., supra, with Hiscox v. Levine, supra, some
courts have invalidated these measures on the ground that the regulation of bulk
and area requirements on a district-wide basis is a legislative function that cannot
be delegated to a planning commission, an administrative agency.
brae Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, supra.

See, e.g., Mill
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measures have arisen in the context of two distinct applications
o f the density zoning technique : cluster zoning and planned unit
development (PUD ) . Cluster zoning o rdinances offer the de
veloper a trade : if he agrees to devote a prescribed percentage
o f this tract to a community use, such as a park or a school
ground, he is authorized in return to build the same numbe r of
residential units on the remaining portion of his tract that he
formerly could have built on the tract as a whole . 184 PUD ordi
nances go further by relaxing building type and use restrictions
as well as area restrictions : single family, multifamily, and high
rise units, and residential, commercial, and light industrial uses
- all of which are segregated within separate districts under
traditional zoning - o ften may be included within a single zone
under these ordinan ces.185
The courts have expressly held that both types of ordinances
will meet the uniformity requirement if they entitle all property
owners within the cluster or PUD district to take advantage of
the opportunity to develop their parcels in accordance with the
flexible density , building type, or use requirements o f these ordi
nances. 1 86

Rejecting a uni formity objection to a cluster ordi

nance, for example, a New Jersey appellate court held in Chrink o
v.

South Brunswick Township Planning Board 187 that the clus

tering technique "accomplishes uniformity because the option
is open to all developers within a zoning district." 1 88 Chrink o
echoes a number o f earlier, nondensity zoning cases in empha
sizing that the uniformity required by statute refers not to the
end product of the development decisions within the district in Chrinko , the minimum lot size of the dwellings actually con
structed there - but to uniform application of the regulation to
all landowners within the district.189

Since the Chicago Plan vests approval for transfers in the local legislative body,
rather than in the planning commission, it will be immune from delegation prob
lems that have afflicted other density transfer measures.
184
See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, NEW APPROACHES TO RESIDENTIAL LAND DE
VELOPMENT (Tech. Bull. No. 40, 1 9 6 1 ) ; w. WHYTE, CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT
( 1 964 ) . Representative state and local cluster provisions are collected in W.
WHYTE, supra, at apps. B & C.
185
See, e.g., Goldston & Scheuer, supra note 1 79, at 2 5 5-62 ( 1 959) ; Symposium,
supra note l 79.

See, e.g., Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, II Cal.
App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 ( 1 970) ; Chrinko v. South B runswick Tp. Plan
ning Bd., 7 7 N.J. Super. 594, 1 8 7 A.2d 2 2 1 (L. Div. 1963 ) ; Cheney v. Village 2
at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A . 2 d 81 ( 1 968 ) .
1 87
7 7 N.J . Super. 594, 1 8 7 A.2d 2 2 1 ( L . Div. 1963 ) .
188
Id. at 601 , 187 A.2d at 2 2 5 .
189
See, e.g., Greenpoint Sav. Bank v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534,
186
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The same rationale appears in Orinda Homeowners Commit
tee v. Board of Supervisors,190 which upheld a PUD ordinance
against a claim of nonuniform application of district regulations
concerning building types :
A residential planned unit development . . . does not conflict
with [ the uni formity provision] merely by reason of the fact
that the units are not uniform, that is, they are not all single
family dwellings and perhaps the multi- family units differ among
themselves. [The uniformity provision ] provides that the regu
lations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building or use
of land throughout the zone.

It does not state that the units

must be alike even as to their character, whether single family
or multi-family. 19 1

The uniformity problem is somewhat more complicated than
the stated rationale in Chrinko , Orinda and related cases indi
cates because access to the benefits of cluster or PUD ordinances
is normally limited to owners of sizeable parcels.192

However,

neither uniformity nor its constitutional equivalent, equal pro
tection, would appear to be violated by the size criterion.

Dis

criminations among the members of a regulated class are permis
sible if they can be reasonably grounded in the p urpose of the
underlying regulation.198 Since the principal objective of both
cluster and PUD ordinances is to promote large-scale develop
ments of attractive design, limiting the benefits of these ordi
nances to developers with substantial land holdings would appear
to meet this test.194

540, 24 N.E.2d 31 9, 3 2 2 ( 1 93 9 ) ,

appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 633 ( 1 940) ; Mandis

v. Gorski, 24 App. Div. 2d r8r, r86, 265 N.Y.S .2d 2 1 0, 216 ( 1 965) .
19 0 n
191

1 92

Cal. App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 ( 1 970) .

Id. at 773, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 90-9 1 .

See, e.g., id. ( 1 8 7 acres) ; Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa.

626, 241 A.2d Sr (1 968 ) ("a large tract of land") .

1 93 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 ( 1 961 ) ; Goesaert v. Cleary,
336 U.S. ro6 ( 1 949 ) . More rigorous review has been applied when "fundamental
interests" or "suspect classifications" are involved. See Developments in the Law
- Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, ro87-u32 ( 1 969) . However, strict
review does not appear to apply to wealth classifications by themselves. See p .
6 2 7 infra.
194

Whether the uniformity provision is even applicable to bulk or area regu 

lations is dubious. On its face, it appears to deal only with use restrictions. See
p. 6 2 0 supra. But see IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-75 5 ( 1 ) ( 1 964) :
Regulations as to height, area, bulk and use of buildings and as to the area
of yards, courts and open spaces shall be uniform for each class of buildings
throughout each district. (Emphasis added.)

At least one court has held the uniformity requirement inapplicable to bulk re

strictions.

See Scrut'ton v. County of Sacramento, 2 75 ·Cal. App . 2d 4 1 2 , 418,
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These density zoning precedents strongly indicate that the
development rights transfer component o f the Chicago Plan will
not fall before the objection that it denies uniform treatment to
lot owners within a transfer district. By providing for the dis
posal of development rights through appropriate public bidding
and sale procedures, the Plan will insure that all district owners
have access to the purchase and enjoyment o f development rights.
This is not to say, o f course, that some lot owners may not enjoy
greater advantages than others as a result of the Plan. The con
figuration of particular lots may be such that the acquisition of
additional development rights would carry no economic benefit
for their owners.195 Since the demand for the rights will probably
exceed the available supply at any given time, 1 96 many lot owners
will lack the financial resources to acquire these rights at pre
vailing market prices. But these or similar impediments to prac
tical as opposed to formal access attend any program in which
surplus public property is disposed of by public sale and bidding
procedures. Moreover, though the benefits o f cluster and PUD
zoning are limited to owners o f large acreage, and thus possibly
to a wealthier class o f developers, this has not deterred judicial
acceptance of these plans. A uniformity challenge to the Chicago
Plan, based on the fact that the bidding technique for disposal
o f transfer rights favors wealthier bidders, would thus seem
unlikely to succeed .
Finally, the Chicago Plan is likely to encounter even less
j udicial resistance under the uniformity requirement than PUD
ordinances and other forms o f innovative zoning that mix diverse
building types and uses. Use zoning has traditionally proven
more controversial than bulk zoning because of its more imme
diate impact upon surrounding property.197 The increasing wil
lingness of American courts to approve the mi:Xture of uses and
building types once thought incompatible 1 9 8 offers strong evi7 9 Cal. Rptr. 8 7 2 , 8 7 7 ( 1 969) . Numerous others h a ve implied this result. See,
e.g., Rockhill v. Township of Chesterfield, 23 N.J . n 7 , 1 2 6 , 1 2 8 A.2d 473, 478
( 1 9 5 7 ) ; Schmidt v. Board, 9 N,J. 405, 417, 88 A.2d 607, 6 1 2-13 ( 1 95 2 ) ; Walker
v. Elkin, 2 5 4 N.C. 85, n 8 S.E.2d l ( 1 961 ) . These decisions appear to recognize
that use zoning has a more immediate impact upon community welfare than bulk
o r area zoning. Hence, they do not insist that the latter secure mathematical
uniformity, but seem willing to approve the flexible application of bulk or area
regulations even in traditional bulk zones.
19 5 As lot size decreases, higher construction becomes unprofitable becau se a
substantial portion of a building's interior space must be given over to its elevator
core and mechanical systems.
196
See Chicago Report 16-19.
1 97 Cf. Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning,

in NEW ZONING 23.
19 8 See, e.g., Millbrae Ass 'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262
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dence that the marginal bul k adjustments permitted under the
Chicago Plan wil l not be found offensive by the courts.
The Chicago Plan appears equally able to surmount any di
rect equal protection challenge to its transfer feature. Recent
Supreme Court decisions have suggested that the mere fact that
a law works to the disadvantage of less wealthy individuals does
not cal l for more than a rational basis for the state's actions. 199
This basis is present in the Chicago Plan: by selling development
rights at the highest possible price, the city maximizes the rev
enues it has available for the operation of its landmark preserva
tion program.
Basing the development rights transfer component of the
Chicago Plan on the density zoning precedents above carries
the additional advantage of differentiating transfers from the
traditional zoning variance. A t first blush, the two may be con
fused because both enable their recipients to erect larger build
ings than are permitted by the regulations of the bulk zone in
which the buildings wil l be located. A court that identified a
development rights transfer with a variance, however, would
probably invalidate the transfer because transfer authorizations
are not administered by the board of zoning appeals and are
not granted on the basis of economic hardship, as required for
variances by most zoning enabling acts.200 But the right o f the
development rights purchaser to build to greater bul k originates
in the bulk regulations applicable to the transfer district, and
hence is substitutive of, rather than a variation from, the regu
lations of the traditional bulk zone. This right, moreover, is
founded on the planning considerations that support density
zoning generally, not on grounds of special hardship.
The transfer authorization and the variance are not wholly
unrelated, however. The administration of variances by lay
Cal. App. 2d 2 2 2 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 ( I 968) ; Hiscox v. Levine, 3 I Misc. 2d g r ,

216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. C t . I96 1 ) .
' 9 9 See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 1 3 7 ( I 9 7I ) ; Dandridge v . Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) .

See Coons, Clune & Sugarman , Educ�tional Opportunity :

A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 5 7

CALIF. L . REV.

305 , 34 9 ( I 969) .
An equal protection challenge to the Chicago Plan should be distinguished
from equal protection challenges to government zoning practices that have the
effect of pricing housing in a given community out of the reach o f low-income

groups. This practice, referred to as "exclusionary zoning," has aroused the in
creasing concern of commentators, see, e.g., Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal
Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. I645 (197 1 ) . Unlike exclusionary
zoning, the Chicago
Plan appears to have no differential impact on the housing of low-income groups.
200 see,
e.g., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZoNING, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra
note 174, § 7 ; CAL. Gov'T CODE § 659o6 (Wes·t
I966) .
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boards has been roundly condemned on all sides 201 because these
boards, whether through incompetence or outright corruption,
have freely granted variances with little regard for the statutory
requirem ent of economic hardship. Municipalities that adopt the
Chicago Plan can restore the variance to its proper role by re
quiring developers who seek bulk variances on spurious grounds
to purchase development rights from landmark owners or from
the municipal development rights bank.
2. Substantive Due Process as a Constraint Upon Transfer
O f the various obstacles to public and judicial
Authorizations.
acceptance o f development rights transfer programs such as the
Chicago Plan, none looms larger than the specter of urban de
sign abuse that critics of these programs have raised. For ex
ample, Beverly Moss Spatt, as a member o f the New York City
Planning Commission, denounced that city's landmarks transfer
program as a "gimmick" that "can only lead to an unplanned
future - to chaos . " 20 2
The argument implicit in this charge cannot be easily dis
missed. The greater bulk authorizations permitted for transferee
sites under the program do appear to call into question the rea
sonableness either o f the community's existing zoning plan or
of the transfer program. I f the existing zoning is sound, it may
be claimed, relaxing bulk restrictions on transferee sites will
overload public services and distort the urban landscape, there
by producing the planning chaos of which Mrs. Spatt warns.
I f it is too stringent, the proper course is to raise prevailing
bulk limitations within the area generally and, in the process,
to remove unwarranted public restrictions on the rights of prop
erty owners there. B ut, the argument proceeds, a program that
retains existing bulk levels for most property owners while re
laxing them for development rights purchasers sacrifices sound
zoning and planning to short-term fiscal advantage. Hence, it is
an arbitrary exercise of the police power, condemned under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.203
This argument fundamentally misconceives the process by
-

201

See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 7 ( 1966) ;

S. ToLL, ZONED

AMERICAN 184 ( 1 969) ; Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of A djustment :
A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY. L .J . 2 73 ( 1 962 ) .
202

Dissent from Resolution CP-2 n66 of the New York City Planning Com

mission to the Board of Estimate, May 1 3 , 1 9 70.
203

See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2 7 2 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)

(zoning ordinances arc valid unless shown to be "clearly arbitrary and unreason
able" ) .

One commentator has summarized the current content of the due process

challenge to zoning regulations

as

follows :

[W]here a zoning ordinance is challenged on the ground that it takes
property without due process of law, [a court] will consider: ( 1 ) the im
pact of the restriction upon the land of the plaintiff (How serious is the
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which bulk levels are determined and the functions that they
serve. As a r�sult, it invests the numbers in the zoning code
with an aura of scientific exactitude that is largely without
foundation in fact. The precision that is attainable in setting
bulk limitations in the downtown commercial and high-rise resi
dential zones that will be included in transfer districts under the
Chicago Plan turns upon the purposes that these l imitations are
designed to achieve. Among these purposes are the following :
regulating population ; insuring an adequate amount of light, air,
and open space ; rationing demands upon public services and fa
cilities ; and accommodating market demands for new office and
residential space. 204
The process by which these objectives are translated into
numbers is among the most complex in the urban design field. 205
It proceeds on at least two levels : fact determination and political
judgment. The facts that must be established or projected, such
as the correlation of population increments with demands upon
public facilities or the capacity of the market to absorb a stated
amount of office space over a given period, are often elusive and
inevitably tentative. 206 Political judgment must be exercised in
selecting the desired development objectives for specific areas
of the city and in resolving conflicts that may be inherent in these
objectives. For example, the bulk levels that will satisfy demands
for office space in a booming economy may clash with those that
are thought appropriate for the particular city's aesthetic char
acter.207 Such clashes are unscrambled, not on the planner's slide
rule, but in the political arena 208 and, in some instances, in public
referenda as well.209
deprivation attributable to the ordinance ? ) ; ( 2 ) the objective of the re
striction (Is it intended to serve the public health, safety, morals, or the
general welfare ? ) ; and ( 3 ) the reasonableness of the restriction (Do the
means selected have a rational tendency to achieve the objective ? ) .
Anderson, A Comment on the Fine Line Between "Regulation" and "Taking," in

NEW ZONING 66, 70. The due process challenge discussed in text relates primarily
to the last consideration enumerated by Anderson.
2

2

04

See authorities cited note 43 supra.

05

Accounts of this process may be found in, e.g.,

G.

FORD, BUILDING HEIGHT,

BULK AND FORM (Harvard City Planning Studies II, 1 93 1 ) ; S. TOLL, supra note
20r, at r6 r-66 ; Randall, The Question of Size: A Re-approach to the Study of
Zoning, 54 ARCH. F. n7 ( 1 93 1 ) .
For excellent analyses o f the process b y which the City o f San Francisco
arrived at the bulk levels of its present zoning ordinance, see Ruth, supra note 69 ;
Svirsky, supra note 6.
206

2 7
0

See authorities cited notes 43 & 205 supra.

Members of the real estate industry have expressed the view that contem
porary zoning impairs downtown development by overemphasizing requirements
of light, air, and open space in central areas. See, e.g., OFFICES 280-81 ; Air Rights

497.

208
209

See S. TOLL, supra note 201, passim.
Objecting to the "Manhattanization" of their skyline resulting from in-
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The specific bulk levels that emerge from this two-step proc
ess fall considerably short o f Platonic absolutes, the slightest
deviation from which threatens the dire planning consequences
predicted by Mrs. Spatt. 210 Were it not for the risk of discrimi
natory official action, 211 in fact, it would be far less arbitrary to
express bulk levels in terms o f a range o f integers rather than
as fixed integers. 2 12 Whether office buildings in the downtown
section o f a major city are permitted to go to sixty-five rather
than sixty-two stories, after all, is not an issue of great moment.
What is critical, however, is that this range of stories - or its
equivalent in terms o f FAR's - accurately reflects the develop
ment objectives that the city seeks to achieve in its downtown
section.
On the basis o f this analysis, the c harge that the Chicago
Plan fosters arbitrary zoning should be rejected since the bulk
increments allotted to development rights purchasers fall within
a range that is defensible in planning terms. The reasonableness
o f deviations under the Chicago Plan from preexisting bulk regu
lations is not called into doubt by the presumed soundness of these
regulations : the net increases, i f any, 2 13 in overall density in the
district under the Chicago Plan will not be enough to bring the
overall density of the district outside that range originally decided
upon, and the increases in bulk on individual transferee lots will
not be arbitrary in planning terms. 2 14 The argument that builders
creased bulk levels adopted in I96I , an organization of San Franciscans succeeded
in having submitted to referendum a proposition that would have required spe
cific voter approval of the construction of any building over six stories or 72 feet.
The proposition was defeated. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1 9 7 I , at 36, col. 1 .
2 1 0 In an exhaustive examination of the problem of the optimum size of
down.town structures, one commentator concluded:
Conclusive quantitative proof of the desirability of these things [sunlight,
air, etc.] is almost impossible, as is also the setting up of any unqualified
standard for safety and well-being below which we should not go. The
general indications would lead to the belief that, while sunlight, air, out
look, privacy, the avoidance of a sense of "shut-in-ness" and of actual con
gestion are highly desirable, we are not able to set up a minimum which,
let us say, if curtailed by IO per cent would spell disaster or if augmented
by I o per cent would spell relative happiness and prosperity.
Randall, supra note 205, at 1 1 7 ; see S. TOLL, supra note 20I , at I 3 7 ·

2 1 1 Professor Mandelker has noted that "conventional l o t regulations are uti 
Mandelker, Reflections on
t h e American System of Planning Controls : A Response to Professor Krasnowiecki,
1 14 u. PA. L. REV. 98, I OI ( I 965 ) .

lized because they simplify the problems of control.''

2 12

One interesting attempt at expressing density for individual parcels on the

basis of a sliding scale of integers is the Land Use Intensity system described in
Hanke, Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity, 1 1 4 U . PA. L. REV.

I 5 , 2 2-30 ( 1 965) .
2 13 See notes 7I & 72 supra.
214
See p. 590 & note 55 supra.

1972]

LANDMARKS PRESERVATION

who do not purchase development rights are sufferi ng unconstitu
tional encroachments upon their right to develop their property
is equally unsound. If all builders i n the development rights
district were allowed to exceed the original bulk restrictions, then
the increase in bulk would exceed the range that had been pre
viously decided upon.
There is good reason to believe that the courts will accept
this analysis and uphold the Plan against the due process at
tack. Judicial approval of density zoning 215 implies acceptance
of the principle that a community may prescribe multiple densi
ties for indivi dual lots as long as a sound planning rationale
supports this decision. Moreover, the courts have traditionally
accorded wide deference to legislative economic measures that
are challenged on substantive due process groun ds. 216 In the
land use field, the American judiciary has proven especially
responsive to the efforts of local governments to meet pressing
development needs, 217 and, since 1926, 218 has approved a broad
array of innovative measures that, like the Chicago Plan, prom
ised to enhance community welfare. 219 In light of this fact, i t
seems most unlikely that the courts would undertake to second
guess either the wisdom or the arithmetic 220 of a community's
transfer program if the latter is rooted in careful planning studies
of the kind envisaged in the Chicago Plan. 22 1
21s

See cases cited note 183 supra.

21 6 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 3 79

( 1 93 7 ) ; Nebbia v.

New York, 291 U.S. 502 ( 1 934) .
217

AND

See Anderson, supra note 203, at 75 ; cf. D. HAGMAN , URBAN PLANNING

LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 75-76 ( 1 9 71 ) ; Heyman, supra note 1 9 7 ,

at 40, 51-52 .
218
The United States Supreme Court upheld zoning as a constitutional exer
cise of the police power that year in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2 7 2
U.S. 3 6 5 (1926 ) . Prior to this decision, substantial conflict existed among the

state

courts concerning the constitutionality of zoning. See Cribbet, Changing
Concepts in the Law of Land Use, 50 IOWA L. REV. 245, 257 (196 7 ) .
2 19
See, e.g., Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. B oard of Supervisors, n Cal. App.
3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (Ct. App. 1 9 70) (PUD zoning) ; Beall v. Montgomery
County Counci.I, 240 Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 ( 1 965) (floating zoning) ; Bucholz
v. Omaha, 1 74 Neb. 862 , 1 2 0 N.W.2d 2 70 (1963 ) ( conditional zoning) ; Chrinko
v. South Brunswick Tp. Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A . 2 d 2 2 1 (L. Div.
1963) (cluster zoning) .
220
On the basis of an exhaustive review of bulk zoning decisions, one com
mentator has concluded that " [s] o far, courts have shown a healthy respect for
the figures arrived at after careful research and planning." Note, supra note 43,
at 512.
2
21 The importance of thorough, well-documented planning studies in with

�tanding

due process as well as equal protection and spot-zoning challenges t o

mnovative measures has been stressed i n a comprehensive analysis o f incentive
zoning measures prepared by Professor Heyman. See Heyman, supra note 1 9 7 ,
Passim. The recurring thesis o f the Heyman study provides additional support for
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite their apparent novelty, the principal features of the
Chicago Plan are solidly grounded in precedents derived from
the areas of condemnation, property, and land use law. Public
programs in which government resells or leases condemned inter
ests in order to recapture program costs are commonplace today,
as the byproduct, leasing, and urban renewal cases discussed
earlier illustrate.222 Similarly, government, whether with or with
out clear statutory authority, has acquired some portion of the
development potential of private property for any number of
reasons including open space preservation ,223 highway beautifica
tion,224 and even use zoning based on eminent domain rather than
the police power.225

Finally, local governments in recent years

have employed their land use powers imaginatively to secure de
sired patterns of community development in areas other than
landmark preservation.

Density zoning (which underpins PUD

and cluster zones) , special development districts, and a variety
o f other measures that duplicate or surpass development rights
transfers in the degree of their departure from traditional zon
ing have been sanctioned in numerous decisions of state courts.226
Taken collectively, these p recedents should provide a firm ba
sis for judicial approval of the Chicago Plan. The prospects for
the Plan's success in court would be even further improved by
an assist from state legislatures. Either o f two types of legisla
tion should prove sufficient. The first, adopted in Illinois , 227

would provide in a single enactment an independent statutory
foundation for each of the Plan's three principal features : the
condemnation and resale o f development rights, the acquisition
o f preservation restrictions, and the transfer of development
rights within trans fer districts. The second would proceed more
modestly against the backdrop of existing statute and case law,
providing legislative s anction only for particular features of the
the position that the Chicago Plan will be upheld by the courts.

As stated by

Heyman :
[The] courts should and will approve a flexible regulatory device where it
is shown that its use sensibly relates to public objectives identified in ad
vance in a planning process and is justified by a detailed explanation
showing the actual relationship between the objective and the action.

Id. at 40.
222

223
224
225
22 6
227

See pp. 605-u supra.
See WHYTE, supra note 13 7 .

See notes 13 7 &

l 6 5-66

supra.

See note 164 supra.

See notes 183 & 2 1 9 supra.
Ill. ·P ub. A. No. 77-1372

(Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 3 1 , 1971 ) , in part to be
!LL. REV. STAT.

codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § n-48.2-1A, in part amending
ch. 24, §§

1 1-48.2-2 & -6

( 1 969) .
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Plan, such as the enforceability of preservation restrictions, which
may be in doubt in a given jurisdiction.228
The likelihood that the Chicago Plan will withstand judicial
challenge, of course, does not of itself establish that it should
be implemented by local governments. In the author's judgment,
the truly hard questions posed by the Plan's adoption are not
legal ones at all. Three of these questions bear special mention.
First, are the risks of favoritism or worse that attend adminis
tration of the Plan acceptable ones for communities that wish to
preserve urban landmarks ?

There is no easy answer to this

question. The willingness of communities throughout the United
States to adopt a wide variety of other innovative land use mea
sures that carry equivalent or greater risks , however, suggests
that the risk factor alone should not necessarily prove conclusive
against the Plan. Second, can municipal planning agencies handle
the urban design challenges that they will confront in establish
ing development rights transfer districts and in supervising the
other planning controls in the C hicago Plan? While the unhap
py history of zoning bonuses in some cities gives cause for hesi
tation,229 the grim prospects for the nation's remaining urban
landmarks if nothing is done must also be weighed in the bal
ance.
Finally, the impact of the Plan on the community's other
incentive programs and development goals must be scrutinized.
In a stagnant real estate market, for example, the development
rights made available under the Plan may undermine the value
of development rights offered to builders under other incentive
programs.

Again, the community's other development goals ,

which may include, for example, increasing the supply of resi
dential units, will be deterred to the extent that the city requires
builders to purchase development rights rather than directly
relaxes the bulk levels permitted as of right in the pertinent
228
229

See pp. 611-17 supra.
Zoning bonuses were originally conceived for the laudable purpose of rais

ing urban amenity levels by encouraging light, air, and circulation in downtown
areas. Abetted by high land and construction costs and allocated on an overly
generous basis, however, they have threatened or destroyed the
vitality of these areas in some instances .

diversity and

Ada Louis Huxtable's description of their

impact upon the redevelopment of New York's Sixth Avenue is vivid and bleak :
The zoning is a failure in urbanistic terms - or how a city looks and
works. The zoning, combined with the rising cost of land and building, has
been the definitive factor in driving out the small enterprises, the shops,
restau �ants and se rvices that make New York a decent and pleasurable
.
.
pla�e m which
to hve and work. In their place is a cold parade of standard
usmess structures set back aimlessly from the street on blank plazas that
ignore each other.

?

Huxtable, Thinking Man's Zoning, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1 9 7 1 ,
see

Chicago Report 1 7 .
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Hence, in pondering the advisability of adopting the

Chicago Plan or any other incentive program for that matter,
the community must ask itself - incentives for what? Resolving
this question requires frank recognition that landmark preserva
tion must compete with other worthy candidates for favorable
regulatory treatment.
230

The conflict of goals portrayed in the text has arisen in New York City_

See Marcus.

